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The Looming Collapse of Restrictions on  
Judicial Campaign Speech 
Nat Stern∗
For the second time in four years, the American Bar Association 
(ABA) in 2007 overhauled its Model Code of Judicial Conduct.1  Like 
its provisional 2003 predecessor,2 the more recent edition focuses on 
compliance with the ruling of the United States Supreme Court in 
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White.3  In striking down a Minnesota 
provision barring a candidate for judicial office from “announc[ing] 
his or her views on disputed legal or political issues,”4 the White Court 
concluded that the state’s restriction improperly encroached on pro-
tected expression.5  On its face, the decision was confined to the de-
fects of the “announce clause” under the First Amendment.  The 
logic and tenor of the Court’s opinion, however, called into question 
the broader enterprise of regulating speech by judicial candidates.  
Prior to White, states with elected judges had widely adopted cam-
paign codes significantly limiting the speech and political activities of 
judicial candidates.  The centerpiece of these codes consisted of pro-
hibitions on statements ostensibly binding candidates on certain is-
sues prior to confronting them in proper judicial proceedings.6  
These and other restrictions were designed to shield the judiciary’s 
independence and neutrality from erosion by the usual dynamics of 
political campaigns.  The codes were thus defended as appropriately 
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 1 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2007), available at http://www.abanet.org/ 
judicialethics/ABA_ MCJC_approved.pdf. 
 2 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1990) (amended 2003). 
 3 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
 4 Id. at 768 (quoting MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) 
(2002)). 
 5 Id.  at 770–74 (finding that the “announce clause” failed strict scrutiny). 
 6 See infra notes 34–43 and accompanying text. 
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balancing judicial impartiality with the competing interests of democ-
ratic accountability and free speech.7
Like the ABA, many states revised their judicial conduct codes 
after White while trying to salvage the essence of their earlier regula-
tory regimes.8  This Article contends, however, that efforts to preserve 
potent constraints on judicial campaign speech are overwhelmingly 
doomed to failure.  Whatever the merits of restrictions in the ab-
stract, White has nullified their underlying premise: viz., that a state, 
having chosen to select judges through elections, can substantially 
modify the ordinary operation of principles governing political 
speech.  Rather, White embodies rejection of the notion that states 
can insulate judicial campaign speech from these principles.  It there-
fore appears likely that other provisions coming before the Court will 
receive the harsh scrutiny that almost invariably invalidates content-
based restrictions on the speech of political candidates.9  In light of 
that philosophy, it is reasonable to expect that most attempts to cur-
tail judicial candidates’ speech will suffer the same fate as Minne-
sota’s announce clause. 
While a pessimistic forecast for judicial campaign restrictions is 
not novel,10 this Article examines their dim prospects from a variety 
of perspectives.  Part I provides a brief overview of judicial elections 
and the evolution of campaign speech codes, the Court’s reasoning 
in White, and the decision’s aftermath.  Part II characterizes White as 
one of a series of major decisions whose full implications have un-
folded in phases.  To support the thesis that White’s reach will far 
transcend the announce clause, this Part first argues that an expan-
sive construction offers a more coherent explanation of the Court’s 
opinion than assuming leniency toward other restrictions.  The pat-
tern of lower court rulings confirms and reinforces this understand-
ing of White.  In addition, realistically considered, a hostile stance to-
ward curbing judicial campaign expression appears more consistent 
with the ideological preferences of the Court’s majority.  Finally, 
 
 7 See, e.g., Jason Miles Levien & Stacie L. Fatka, Cleaning up Judicial Elections: Ex-
h of Judicial Candidates are Uncon-
ee infra note 97. 
amining the First Amendment Limitations on Judicial Campaign Regulation, 2 MICH. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 71, 84–88 (1997); Randall T. Shepard, Campaign Speech: Restraint and Liberty 
in Judicial Ethics, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1059, 1060 (1996). 
 8 See infra notes 34–43 and accompanying text. 
 9 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Restrictions on the Speec
stitutional, 35 IND. L. REV. 735 (2002) [hereinafter Chemerinsky, Restrictions] (urging 
this approach toward the Model Code shortly before the decision in White was is-
sued). 
 10 S
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and 
notes alternatives available to critics of politicized judicial races.11
I. JUDICIAL ELEC IMITATIONS, AND 
iscern the ultimate 
contours of the power to regulate this expression. 
A. tics, and the Progress of  
 
White resembles decisions in other areas in which an ultimately ex-
pansive doctrine was somewhat obscured by the specific setting in 
which it arose.  Assuming this strict approach, Part III describes how 
specific restrictions on candidates’ speech and related activity can be 
invalidated.  Part IV briefly surveys the likely landscape of an elected 
judiciary unhampered by enforceable campaign restrictions, 
TIONS, CAMPAIGN SPEECH L
THE REACTION TO WHITE 
The widespread selection of state judges through popular elec-
tion forms the critical backdrop to White.  That practice in turn has 
evoked special restrictions on judicial electioneering rooted in 
courts’ distinctive role under the separation of powers.  White sent an 
emphatic though imprecise signal of the Court’s impatience with this 
justification for limiting judicial campaign speech.  Scholars, states, 
courts, and bar associations have since sought to d
An Elected Judiciary, its Cri
Campaign Speech Codes 
Although various appointive systems of selecting state judges 
marked the nation’s early history,12 the mid-nineteenth century wit-
nessed a widespread shift to judicial elections.13  The movement to-
ward popular election is widely attributed to the Jacksonian democ-
 
 11 The Article does not add to the abundant literature analyzing the relative mer-
its of electing and appointing judges.  See infra notes 17–26 and accompanying text 
(offering a sampling of such criticism).  Likewise, while judicial candidates’ solicita-
tion of campaign contributions is discussed in Part III.E, infra, debate over the regu-
lation of judicial campaign finance lies beyond the scope of the Article.  For contri-
butions to that debate, see, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Some Realism About Electoralism: 
Rethinking Judicial Campaign Finance, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 505 (1999); David Barnhizer, 
“On the Make”: Campaign Funding and the Corrupting of the American Judiciary, 50 CATH. 
U. L. REV. 361 (2001); Erwin Chemerinsky, Preserving an Independent Judiciary: The 
Need for Contribution and Expenditure Limits in Judicial Elections, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
5 (2004). 
 TENURE OF JUDGES 80–135 (1944); Kermit 
133 (1998); Yoav Dotan, Campaign Finance Reform and the Social Inequality Paradox, 37 
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 95
 12 Glenn R. Winters, Selection of Judges—An Historical Introduction, 44 TEX. L. REV. 
1081, 1081–82 (1966). 
 13 See EVAN HAYNES, THE SELECTION AND
L. Hall, The Judiciary on Trial: State Constitutional Reform and the Rise of an Elected Judici-
ary, 1846–1860, 45 HISTORIAN 337 (1983). 
STERN_FINAL 1/16/2008  5:59:23 PM 
66 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:63 
 judges stand 
for p
 
ratic impulse of that period.14  Since then, the idea of judicial ac-
countability to voters has had enduring appeal; judicial elections are 
now held in a variety of forms in thirty-nine states.15  By one oft-cited 
calculation, approximately eighty-seven percent of state
opular election at least once in their career.16
Despite their popularity, elections have long been opposed as a 
means of choosing judges.  Alexander Hamilton famously urged the 
lifetime appointment of judges to ensure their independence from 
both other branches and the popular will.17  While the Constitution 
implemented Hamilton’s proposal for the federal judiciary,18 state 
elections have left modern critics amplifying his concerns.  Many re-
gard judicial elections as incompatible with the independence and 
impartiality that judging requires.19  Observers have asserted an inevi-
table collision between a judge’s obligation to follow the law and a 
 
 14 See, e.g., JAMES W. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 140 
(1950); Joseph R. Grodin, Developing a Consensus of Constraint: A Judge’s Perspective on 
Judicial Retention Elections, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1969, 1970–71 (1988); see also FRANCIS R. 
AUMANN, THE CHANGING AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEMS 187–89 (1940) (suggesting that 
Jacksonian Democrats also sought to replace Whig judges with party loyalists). 
 15 See AM. JUDICATURE SOCIETY, JUDICIAL SELECTION OF THE STATES: APPELLATE AND 
GENERAL JURISDICTION COURTS (2004), http://www.ajs.org/js/JudicialSelectionCharts 
.pdf.  This website, periodically updated, reports methods of judicial selection among 
the states under a number of categories.  The distinctions noted include those be-
tween initial selection and retention; between partisan and nonpartisan elections; 
and among trial courts, intermediate appellate courts, and courts of last resort.  Id.; 
e
 and retention systems for state court judges, see Roy A. Schotland, Should 
t 8, 10 [hereinafter Schotland, 
UTGERS  EV
ndidates’ Free Speech Rights 
se  also THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 251–54 (2006) 
(charting selection and retention of state governments).  For a chart summarizing 
selection
Judges Be More Like Politicians?, CT. REV., Spring 2002, a
Should Judges].
  Robert C. Berness, Note, Norms of Judicial Behavior: Understanding Restrictions on 
Judicial Candidate Speech in the Age of Attack Politics, 53 R L. R . 1027, 1028 
16
(2001). 
 17 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 18 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (providing for appointment by president with 
advice and consent of the Senate); id. art. III, § 1 (providing that judges shall hold 
office “during good Behaviour”). 
 19 See, e.g., Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, The Case for Adopting Appointive Ju-
dicial Selection Systems for State Court Judges, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 273, 277–78 
(2002); Matthew J. O’Hara, Restriction of Judicial Election Ca
After Buckley: A Compelling Constitutional Limitation?, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 197, 235 
(1994) (asserting that only lifetime appointment “can fully insulate judges from the 
pressure to conform their decisions to the beliefs of others”); Penny J. White, Preserv-
ing the Legacy: A Tribute to Chief Justice Harry L. Carrico, One who Exalted Judicial Inde-
pendence, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 615, 616 (2004). 
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candidate’s need to court popularity.20  In some instances, it is sug-
gested, judges succumb to the temptation to act politically rather 
than judicially.21  In particular, the threat of undue responsiveness to 
popular sentiment is framed as the “majoritarian difficulty” that arises 
when elected judges are called upon to protect unpopular liberties.22  
In one view, resolution of cases by judges who must answer to the 
electorate inherently threatens—or even violates—due process.23  
Even if judges can disregard the potential electoral consequences of 
their decisions, “the public’s confidence in the judiciary could be un-
dermined simply by the possibility that judges would be unable to do 
so.”24  Moreover, voters are said to be insufficiently informed to make 
thoughtful choices among judicial candidates.25  Finally, the recent 
 
 20 See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the 
 
meone a good judge are generally different from those that make a person a 
yphonic 
3); Ma-
Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 726–29 (1995); Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judi-
cial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43, 51 (2003).  But see Michael R. Dimino, Sr., The 
Worst Way of Selecting Judges—Except all the Others that Have Been Tried, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 
267, 267–73 (2005) (questioning whether electoral accountability renders state 
judges incapable of protecting rights guaranteed in state constitutions).
 21 See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, SECTION OF JUDICIAL ADMIN., THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 45 (5th ed. 1971) (stating that “[t]he curse of the elective 
system is that it turns every judge into a politician”); Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. 
Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind When It Runs For Office?, 48 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 247, 258 (2004) (finding that judges increase sentences awarded as reelec-
tion approaches); Gerald F. Uelmen, Crocodiles in the Bathtub: Maintaining the Inde-
pendence of State Supreme Courts in an Era of Judicial Politicization, 72 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1133, 1133 (1997) (comparing situation of judge deciding controversial cases 
while facing reelection to “finding a crocodile in your bathtub” in that “it’s hard to 
think about much else while you’re shaving”); see also Marie A. Failinger, Can a Good
Judge Be a Good Politician? Judicial Elections from a Virtue Ethics Approach, 70 MO. L. REV. 
433, 465–513 (2005) (arguing against judicial elections on grounds that qualities that 
make so
good politician); Katie A. Whitehead, Comment, Loose Lips Sink Ships: The Implications 
of a Liberal Policy Restricting Judicial Speech, 28 S. ILL. U. L.J. 159, 170 (2003). 
 22 See, e.g., Croley, supra note 20, at 694, 787–90; Robert A. Schapiro, Pol
Federalism: State Constitutions in the Federal Courts, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1409, 1415, 1438 
(1999).
 23 See Robert M. O’Neil, The Canons in the Courts: Recent First Amendment Rulings, 35 
IND. L. REV. 701, 723 (2002); Scott D. Weiner, Note, Popular Justice: State Judicial Elec-
tions and Procedural Due Process, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 187, 188–89 (1996). 
 24 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 120 U.S. 765, 789 (2002) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). 
 25 See Allen T. Klots, The Selection of Judges and the Short Ballot, in JUDICIAL 
SELECTION AND TENURE: SELECTED READINGS 83–84 (Glenn R. Winters ed., 197
rie Hojnacki & Lawrence Baum, Choosing  Judicial Candidates: How Voters Explain Their 
Decisions, 75 JUDICATURE 300, 300–02 (1992); NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, 
CALL TO ACTION: STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL SUMMIT ON IMPROVING JUDICIAL 
SELECTION 40–42 (expanded ed. 2002), http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/p 
ublications/Res_JudSel_ CallToActionPub.pdf [hereinafter CALL TO ACTION].
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p rise in judicial campaign spending has aroused suspicion that 
judicial decisions can be colored by a sense of obligation to contribu-
tors.26
Dissatisfaction with the putative flaws of judicial elections has 
sparked repeated calls for replacing them with “merit selection” 
through appointment.  Under this method, the governor selects a 
judge from a list compiled by a nonpartisan judicial nominating 
commission. 27  The ABA has conspicuously endorsed merit selection 
for decades.28  As currently championed by the American Judicature 
Society, the system includes a concession to the desire for democratic 
accountability: viz., exposing judges to an uncontested retention elec-
tion after a specified term.29  Also known as the Missouri Plan, this 
approach was apparently endorsed by Justice O’Connor in her con-
currence in White.30  While sixteen states employ the Missouri plan or 
another appointment system,31 the broader effort to supplant judicial 
elections with appointments has foundered on public resistance.  A 
poll conducted in 2001 found that voters in states wi
whelmingly preferred election to appointment;32 the resounding 
defeats of proposals in Ohio and Florida to switch from elective to 
appointive systems33 appear to confirm this attitude. 
Faced with the reality that “people want to elect judges,”34 states 
have tried to deter campaign abuses through limitations on the 
speech of judicial candidates.  Such restrictions, part of a general 
 26 See David Goldberger, The Power of Special Interest Groups to Overwhelm Judicial 
lec en the Code of Judicial Conduct, Cam-
ai nce Laws, and the First Amendment, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (2003); Adam Liptak 
 Judiciary 
note 19, at 301. 
 (2002) 
epublican Party of Minnesota v. White and the Announce 
TTE L. 
E
untability and Judicial Independence, 64 OHIO ST. 
.J
didate Speech After Republican Party of Minnesota 
E tion Campaigns: The Troublesome Interaction Betwe
p gn Fina
& Janet Roberts, Campaign Cash Mirrors a High Court’s Rulings, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 
2006, at A1; Press Release, American Bar Association, Poll: Confidence in
Eroded by Judges’ Need to Raise Campaign Money (Aug. 12, 2002). 
 27 Behrens & Silverman, supra 
 28 Id. 
 29 AM. JUDICATURE SOCIETY, MERIT SELECTION: THE BEST WAY TO CHOOSE THE BEST 
JUDGES, http://www.ajs.org/js/ms_descrip.pdf (last visited Dec. 31, 2007). 
 30 See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 791–92
(O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 31 Anca Cornis-Pop, R
Clause in Light of Theories of Judge and Voter Decisionmaking: With Strategic Judges and Ra-
tional Voters, the Supreme Court was Right to Strike Down the Clause, 40 WILLAME
R V. 123, 130 & n.45 (2004) (collecting states’ provisions for appointment). 
  Thomas R. Phillips, Electoral Acco32
L . 137, 145 n.55 (2003).
 33 See Roy A. Schotland, Financing Judicial Elections, 2000: Change and Challenge, 
2001 MICH. ST. L. REV. 849, 886–90 (2001) [hereinafter Schotland, Financing]. 
 34 Jan Witold Baran, Judicial Can
v. White, CT. REV., Spring 2002, at 12. 
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code of judicial ethics, originated in the ABA’s 1924 Canons of Judi-
cial Ethics.35  Hortatory and vague,36 this early version did not impose 
enforceable restraints on campaign expression.37  When the ABA re-
placed the 1924 canons with the Model Code of Judicial Conduct38 in 
1972, however, the new canon on campaign activity contained con-
siderably stronger language.  Its key provision stated that “[a] candi-
date for judicial office should not make pledges or promises of con-
duct in office other than the faithful and impartial performance of 
the duties of the office; announce his views on disputed legal or po-
litical issues; or misrepresent his identity, qualifications, present posi-
tion, or other fact.”39  Later, concern about potential overbreadth40 
prompted the ABA to eliminate the announce clause.  The 1990 re-
vised Model Code41 instead prohibited candidates from making 
“statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate with re-
spect to cases, controversies or issues that are
ourt.”42  On the eve of the Court’s decision in White, most states 
with elected judges had adopted “campaign speech restrictions pat-
terned after” the 1972 or 1990 model canons.43
These rules were driven by a belief that traditional campaign 
platforms conflict with the ideal of judicial neutrality.  To attract sup-
port, a judicial candidate may make a commitment to decide a cer-
tain kind of case in a particular way.44  If elected, the successful can-
didate would presumably feel obligated to act in accordance with that 
commitment.45  Since judicial decisionmaking contemplates the un-
biased consideration of evidence and arguments, such commitments 
represent “the antithesis of the judicial process.”46  Moreover, even 
 
 35 CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS 30 (1924) (amended 1933). 
 36 See id. (providing, inter alia, that a candidate “should do nothing . . . to create 
is office with bias, partiality or im-
ess of the Rules Governing 
the impression that if chosen, he will administer h
proper discrimination”). 
37  See Max Minzner, Gagged but not Bound: The Ineffectiven
L.Judicial Campaign Speech, 68 UMKC  REV. 209, 212–13 (1999). 
38
ONDUCT (1972).   MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL C
39  Id.  Canon 7(B)(1)(c). 
 40 See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT app. C (1990). 
41  MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1990) (amended 2003). 
42  Id. Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(ii). 
 43 Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 880, 880 nn.21–22 (8th Cir. 
2001). 
 44 See Buckley v. Ill. Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 228 (7th Cir. 1993).
 45 See id.; Melinda Gann Hall, Justices as Representatives: Elections and Judicial Politics 
in the American States, 23 AM. POL’Y Q. 485, 495–97 (1995). 
  Stephen Gillers, “If Elected, I Promise [ ]”—What Should Judicial Candidates Be Al-
lowed to Say?, 35 IND. L. REV. 725, 726 (2002); see also 
46
Megan Sloane Gordon & Mat-
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vance of trial or arguments.52  Those who attain legislative and execu-
 
 
where judges remain unaffected by campaign assurances, the appear-
ance of justice is said to suffer when judicial rulings coincide with 
candidate commitments.  Nor will it be only losing parties who ques-
tion whether they received “a fair hearing by an independent and 
impartial judge.”47  Campaign stances on issues, it is argued, also un-
dermine public confidence in the judiciary by fostering the percep-
tion of candidates as political aspirants rather than “im
follow the dictates of the law.”48  Restrictions on candidates’ 
campaign rhetoric have thus been explained as serving “[t]he state’s 
interest in ensuring that judges be and appear to be neither antago-
nistic nor beholden to any interest, party, or person.”49
Notably, a strong sense of the judiciary’s fundamentally distinct 
character informs these justifications for limiting campaign speech.  
Defenders of restrictions believe that a “critical difference”50 exists be-
tween the function of the judge and that of others in government. 
They contrast the representative capacity of legislators and executives 
with the obligation of judges to serve no constituency.51  While voters 
expect legislative and executive officials to abide by promises to enact 
certain policies, judges cannot be bound to specific outcomes in ad-
thew Edward Wetzel, The Precarious Balance of Judicial Candidate Speech and Judicial Eth-
ics: The Announce Clause in the Aftermath of Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 16 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 613, 618 (2003) (stating that campaign promises “are com-
pletely antithetical to the ideas of neutrality, unbiasedness, and cold impartiality that 
 944 F.2d 137, 142 (3d Cir. 1991) (stating as justification for announce 
that later come 
inhere to the judiciary”). 
 47 Gerald Stern, The Changing Face of Judicial Elections, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1507, 
1509 (2004) (asserting that “parties on the ‘wrong’ side of the issues” on which 
judges have committed themselves “cannot be confident that they will receive fair 
hearings”). 
 48 Lloyd B. Snyder, The Constitutionality and Consequences of Restrictions on Campaign 
Speech by Candidates for Judicial Office, 35 UCLA L. REV. 207, 214 (1987) (noting this 
justification for restrictions on campaign speech); see Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd. of 
Sup. Ct. of Pa.,
clause that “[i]f judicial candidates during a campaign prejudge cases 
before them, the concept of impartial justice becomes a mockery”); Shepard, supra 
note 7, at 1067 (defending restrictions as helping judges to avoid “hurly-burly of 
sometimes political strife” and to “ensure that courts are perceived as even-handed 
institutions”). 
49  Morial v. Judiciary Comm’n, 565 F.2d 295, 302 (5th Cir. 1977). 
 50 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 798 (2002) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting). 
 51 See, e.g., id. at 805 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); SARAH MATHIAS, ELECTING JUSTICE: 
A HANDBOOK OF JUDICIAL ELECTION REFORMS 5 (1990). 
 52 See Ackerson v. Ky. Judicial Ret. & Removal Comm’n, 776 F. Supp. 309, 313 
(W.D. Ky. 1991); Ofer Raban, Judicial Impartiality and the Regulation of Judicial Election 
Campaigns, 15 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 205, 214 (2004) (“[O]pinions which election-
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the 
 was the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Republican Party of Min-
nesota v. Kelly,57 sustaining Minnesota’s announce clause as narrowly 
upreme Court overturned 
in W
 
tive office rely on broad popular appeal; a crucial duty of the judge is 
to sustain minority rights in the teeth of popula
very essence of a judge is not to be a politician, and campaign 
speech restrictions are seen as an important mechanism for prevent-
ing this confusion of roles.54
Even before White, however, many judicial candidates disputed 
the sufficiency of this rationale.  The 1990s alone produced over a 
dozen rulings on challenges to campaign speech restrictions.  Early in 
the decade, results were roughly balanced between acceptance and 
rejection of arguments that these limitations trenched on protected 
speech.55  Decisions from the same part of the following decade, how-
ever, reflected increasing judicial animosity toward restrictions.56  An 
exception
construed.58  It was this holding that the S
hite. 
 
eering legislators are free to express and then to try to act upon may be totally out of 
bounds for elected judges and a threat to their duties of office.”). 
 53 See United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); Stern, supra 
note 47, at 1511 (stating that “basic, well-established rights are not subject to what a 
majority of voters want, and a judge’s loyalty must be to the law and . . . not to the 
 they should not act like them” as supporting ban 
it clause except as applied to comments on issues 
 (Mich. 2000), cert. denied, 
Minn. 1999), 
 (interpreting prohibition as applying only to issues likely to come 
wishes of voters”). 
 54 Alan B. Morrison, The Judge Has No Robes: Keeping the Electorate in the Dark About 
What Judges Think About the Issues, 36 IND. L. REV. 719, 731 (2003) (citing proposition 
that judges “are not politicians, and
on pledges by judicial candidates). 
 55 Compare, e.g., ACLU of Fla. v. Fla. Bar, 744 F. Supp. 1094, 1096–98 (N.D. Fla. 
1990) (invalidating state’s announce clause), and J.C.J.D. v. R.J.C.R., 803 S.W.2d 953, 
954–55 (Ky. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 816 (1991) (invalidating state’s announce 
clause), with, e.g., Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd. of Sup. Ct. of Pa., 944 F.2d 137, 140–43 
(3d Cir. 1991) (upholding state’s announce clause on interpretation that clause ap-
plied only to issues likely to come before the court), and Ackerson, 776 F. Supp. at 
314–15 (sustaining state’s comm
regarding court administration).
 56 See Weaver v. Bonner, 114 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1342–43 (N.D. Ga. 2000) (striking 
down ban on false statements by judicial candidates), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 309 
F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2002); Butler v. Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm., 802 So. 2d 207 
(Ala. 2001) (overturning ban on statements “that would be deceiving or misleading 
to a reasonable person”); In re Chmura, 608 N.W.2d 31, 41
531 U.S. 828 (2000) (invalidating ban on false statements).
  247 F.3d 854, 857 (8th Cir. 2001), aff’g 63 F. Supp. 2d 967 (D. 57
rev’d sub nom. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
 58 Id. at 881–82
before the court). 
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B. The White Decision and its Repercussions 
As noted earlier, the announce clause struck down in White pro-
hibited a candidate for judicial office from “announc[ing] his or her 
views on disputed legal or political issues.”59  The challenge was origi-
nally brought by a former candidate for the Minnesota Supreme 
Court; he was later joined by the Minnesota Republican Party and 
others.60  In reviewing the clause, the Court proceeded on the Eighth 
Circuit’s premise—accepted by the parties—that this type of restric-
tion warranted strict scrutiny.61  Minnesota was therefore obliged to 
demonstrate that the announce clause was narrowly tailored to serve 
its asserted compelling state interest in judicial impartiality and the 
appearance of impartiality.62  Although the court of appeals had 
reached just this conclusion,63 the Court found that the Eighth Cir-
cuit’s references to “impartiality” suffered from lack of definitional 
clarity.64  Accordingly, Justice Scalia’s opinion revolved around the in-
terpretation of that term in the context of judicial behavior. 
First, the Court considered the “traditional” meaning of judicial 
impartiality as the “lack of bias for or against either party to the pro-
ceeding.”65  While recognizing that due process requires this kind of 
impartiality, the Court found that the announce clause was not nar-
rowly tailored to promote it.66  The Court distinguished between a re-
striction on speech “for or against particular parties” and the clause’s 
more expansive prohibition of speech “for or against particular is-
sues.”67  Second, the Court entertained but rejected the notion of im-
partiality as “lack of preconception in favor of or against a particular 
legal view.”68  Even if the announce clause advanced this interest, the 
Court deemed this quality “neither possible nor desirable” in a 
judge;69 anyone qualified to serve as a judge will have formed views on 
 59 White, 536 U.S. at 768 (quoting MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 
5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2000)). 
s, Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 
0  
.3d at 867. 
.S. at 775. 
t 775. 
 60 See Brief for Petitioner
(2 02) (No. 01-521).
 61 White, 536 U.S. at 774. 
 62 Id. at 774–75. 
 63 Kelly, 247 F
 64 White, 536 U
 65 Id. a
 66 Id. at 776. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id at 777. 
 69 Id. at 778. 
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d to as-
sess 
lections could not combat them through ex-
cessi
 
at least some legal issues.70  Finally, the Court addressed impartiality 
as meaning “openmindedness,” or the willingness to consider views 
opposed to the judge’s preconceptions.71  The Court decline
the strength of this interest because it did not believe that the 
Minnesota Supreme Court had adopted the announce clause for this 
purpose.  Rather, the Court concluded, the clause was “so woefully 
underinclusive as to render belief in that purpose a challenge to the 
credulous.”72  Since the ban was confined to the election campaign, it 
omitted a vast range of opportunities for the announcement of views 
that might compromise openmindedness or its appearance.73
While joining the Court’s opinion, Justices O’Connor and Ken-
nedy wrote separately to sound additional themes.  Concurring to 
express “concerns about judicial elections generally,”74 Justice 
O’Connor emphasized the threat to impartiality posed by judicial 
sensitivity to electoral consequences and contributors’ interests.75  
Nevertheless, she concluded, a state that assumes these risks by con-
tinuing to hold judicial e
ve restrictions on speech.76  Justice Kennedy, on the other hand, 
concurred to articulate a more far-reaching rationale than the 
Court’s for invalidating the announce clause.  The relevant principle, 
he argued, was that “content-based speech restrictions that do not fall 
within any traditional exception should be invalidated without in-
quiry.”77  Accordingly, Minnesota’s restraint on political speech was 
per se unconstitutional.78
Writing for the four dissenters,79 Justice Stevens attacked what he 
viewed as the two major fallacies of Court’s opinion: an underap-
praisal of the “importance of judicial independence and impartiality, 
and an assumption that judicial candidates should have the same 
 
 70 See White, 536 U.S. at 777–78; id. at 777 (stating that “it is virtually impossible to 
n does not have preconceptions about the law”). 
rving that statements during campaigns 
m public commitments to legal positions 
a -be) undertake”). 
., concurring). 
, J., concurring). 
ment ”). 
d Breyer in dissent.  
fi d a judge who 
 71 Id. at 778. 
 72 Id. at 780. 
 73 See id. at 778–80; id. at 779 (obse
a ount to “an infinitesimal portion of the 
th t judges (or judges-to
 74 Id. at 788 (O’Connor, J
 75 See id. at 788–90. 
 76 White, 536 U.S. at 792. 
 77 Id. at 793 (Kennedy
 78 See id. (calling direct restrictions on candidate speech “simply beyond the 
power of govern
 79 Justice Stevens was joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, an
See generally id. 
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that 
“jud
tators, whose reactions varied over the merit as well as the effect of 
 echoed a lawyer for the plaintiffs86 in hailing the 
e decision in terms reminiscent of the dis-
ite.  Numerous critics voiced their fear that the ruling 
 
freedom” as campaigners for other offices “to express themselves on 
matters of current public importance.”80  The “critical difference”81 
between the functions of judges and of other public officials, Justice 
Stevens believed, defeated both of these assumptions.  Also speaking 
for all the dissenters, Justice Ginsburg similarly emphasized 
ges perform a function fundamentally different” from that of 
elected representatives.82  Therefore, she argued, Minnesota was enti-
tled to adopt an election process designed to safeguard the integrity 
of that function.83  In particular, she defended the announce clause 
as an indispensable adjunct to the state’s protection of due process 
through its pledges or promises clause.84  Absent the announce 
clause, candidates could easily circumvent the ban on pledges and 
promises by couching them in the language of announcements.85
The split within the White Court was mirrored among commen-
the holding.  Some
outcome as a signal victory for freedom of speech.87  Many others, 
however, denounced th
senters in Wh
could corrode judicial impartiality.88  In a similar vein, some accused 
 
 80 536 U.S. at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 81 Id. at 798. 
 82 Id. at 803 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 83 See id. at 808–09. 
 84 Id. at 816 (noting potential for due process violations from judicial candidate’s 
promise to rule certain way). 
 85 Id. at 819. 
 86 See Terry Carter, Judicial Races, Litigation Likely to Heat Up, A.B.A. J. E-REPORT, 
Oct. 2005 (quoting lawyer as stating that the Court held that the First Amendment 
“applies with full force” to judicial elections). 
 87 See James L. Swanson, Judicial Elections and the First Amendment: Freeing Political 
Speech, 2002 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 85, 86 (interpreting White as affirming that “we can-
h During Judicial Election Campaigns, 56 ARK. L. REV. 677, 695 (2003) (de-
not have politics without robust and unfettered speech”); Morrison, supra note 54, at 
719 (asserting that benefits from public’s learning candidates’ views on issues “far 
outweigh the possible negative effects of permitting those views to be expressed dur-
ing an election campaign”); Edward Walsh, Curbs on Judicial Hopefuls Lifted, WASH. 
POST, June 28, 2002, at A10 (quoting legal director of the ACLU as expressing the 
organization’s concern that “the way to preserve judicial integrity is not to place re-
straints on candidates’ speech”); Peter Gregory Juetten, Note, Should They Stay or 
Should They Go: The Implications of Republican Party of Minnesota v. White on Restric-
tions of Speec
scribing Minnesota’s justification for announce clause as “implausible rationale for 
restricting speech”).
 88 See, e.g., Failinger, supra note 21, at 486–88; Raban, supra note 52, at 212; David 
Neil McCarty, Note, Walk Before They Make Us Run: Republican Party of Minnesota v. 
White and the Need for Judicial Reform in Mississippi, 23 MISS. C. L. REV. 51, 65–66 
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marked by varying degrees of optimism that White left other signifi-
cant restraints intact.96  At the same time, warnings of White’s poten-
 
the Court of slighting due process rights.89  Also much like the dis-
sents, a number of analyses faulted the Court for ignoring the distinc-
tions between judges and “politicians.”90  In addition, observers 
charged that the decision displayed an unrealistic grasp of election 
campaigns,91 encouraged interest groups’ efforts to gain influence 
with judges,92 and would diminish the caliber of judicial candidates.93  
A prominent scholar sympathetic to campaign speech regulation, 
however, had a more nuanced assessment.  While conceding that the 
announce clause improperly intruded on protected speech,94 Richard 
Briffault discussed how White might be reconciled with the validity of 
other restrictions.95  Much other commentary as well has been 
 
(2003); see also Brennan Ctr. for Justice, Republican Party of Minnesota v. White: 
What Does the Decision Mean for the Future of State Judicial Elections?, http://www. 
brennancenter.org/stack_detail.asp?key=348&subkey=35267 (last visited Dec. 31, 
2007) (asserting that White threatened loss of public faith in the elected judges’ abil-
ity to decide issues “in a manner faithful to the adjudicative ideals of fairness and im-
partiality”).
  See, e.g., Angela Allen, Note, The Judicial Election Gag is Removed—Now Texas 89
Should Remove its Gag and Respond, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 201, 218–19 (2003); 
Rainbow Forbes, Note, Candidates’ Speech in Judicial Elections According to Republican 
Party of Minnesota v. White: Is There a Better Way?,     
faith with the people 
und off on Election Issues, 88 A.B.A. J. 
30 N. KY. L. REV. 275, 291 (2003); 
Julie Schuering Schuetz, Comment, Judicial Campaign Speech Restrictions in Light of Re-
publican Party of Minnesota v. White, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 295, 338 (2004). 
 90 See, e.g., Margaret H. Marshall, Dangerous Talk, Dangerous Silence: Free Speech, Ju-
dicial Independence, and the Rule of Law, 24 SYDNEY L. REV. 455, 467–68 (2002) (arguing 
eak that White “ignores an important distinction: Politicians br
when they abandon their advocacy.  Judges break faith with the people when they 
abandon their neutrality.”); White, supra note 19, at 624; see also David G. Savage, 
Run ing Stance: Judicial Candidates Now Free to Son
32, 32 (2002) (quoting ABA president as calling White “a bad decision [that] will 
open a Pandora’s box” and lead to “judicial candidates running for office by an-
nouncing their positions on particular issues”). 
 91 See, e.g., David B. Bogard, Republican Party of Minnesota v. White: The Lifting of 
Judicial Speech Restraint, 26 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1, 14 (2003); Schotland, 
Should Judges, supra note 15, at 8. 
 92 See, e.g., Terry Carter, Boosting the Bench: The U.S. Chamber of Commerce is Spending 
Big Bucks to Influence Judicial Elections, 88 A.B.A J. 28, 34 (2002) [hereinafter Carter, 
Boosting]; Nathan Richard Wildermann, Comment, Bought Elections: Republican Party 
of Minnesota v. White, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 765, 765 (2003). 
 93 See, e.g., Schotland, Should Judges, supra note 15, at 8. 
 94 Richard Briffault, Judicial Campaign Codes After Republican Party of Minnesota 
v. White, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 181, 205–06 (2004). 
 95 See id. at 209–33. 
 96 See, e.g., Francisco R. Maderal, Regulating Judicial Campaign Speech: Republican 
Party of Minnesota v. White on Remand, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 809, 817–19 (2006); 
Katherine A. Moerke, Must More Speech be the Solution to Harmful Speech?  Judicial Elec-
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tial for sweeping invalidation of restrictions have emanated in some 
quarters.97
Revisions of state codes in the wake of White appeared to reflect a 
similar diversity of opinion about the decision’s ultimate scope.  
Some responses were quite modest: e.g., Kentucky’s proclamation 
that White did not affect its canon on judicial statements98 and Ten-
nessee’s replacing the state’s commentary on its commit clause with-
out formally amending the provision.99  In an obvious step, Pennsyl-
vania hastened to retract its announce clause100 before the provision 
suffered its Texas counterpart’s fate of post-White judicial disap-
proval.101  White’s impact on judicial conduct codes, however, reached 
 
tions After Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 48 S.D. L. REV. 262, 303–12 
(2003); Bola Ogunro, How Can the Integrity of Judicial Elections be Safeguarded After 
White?, COMMC’N LAWYER, Winter 2003, 19, 20; Barbara E. Reed, Tripping the Rift: 
White Landscape, 56 M L. R . Navigating Judicial Speech Fault Lines in the Post- ERCER  EV
971, 982–85 (2005); Tobin A. Sparling, Keeping up Appearances: The Constitutionality of 
 of judges whose campaign speech displays bias leaves 
 restrictions); Joe Cutler, Note, 
ctions, MONT. LAWYER, Aug. 2002, at 5; Richard L. Hasen, First Amendment 
the Model Code of Judicial Conduct’s Prohibition of Extrajudicial Speech Creating the Appear-
ance of Bias,  19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 441, 444–45 (2006); Stern, supra note 47, at 
1543; Wendy R. Weiser, Regulating Judges’ Political Activity After White, 68 ALB. L. REV. 
651, 665–701 (2005); Catherine Ava Begaye, Note, Are There Any Limits on Judicial 
Candidates’ Political Speech After Republican Party of Minnesota v. White?, 33 N.M. L. 
REV. 449, 472–74  (2003); Lindsay E. Lippman, Note, Republican Party of Minnesota 
v. White: The End of Judicial Election Reform?, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 137, 159–60 
(2003); Wildermann, supra note 92, at 790–93; Alexandrea Haskell Young, Note, The 
First Chink in the Armor? The Constitutionality of State Laws Burdening Judicial Candidates 
After Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 433, 461–66 (2004). 
 97 See, e.g., Michelle T. Friedland, Disqualification or Suppression: Due Process and the 
Response to Judicial Campaign Speech, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 563 (2004) (asserting that 
availability of disqualification
few or no restrictions on truthful campaign speech constitutional); Developments in the 
Law—Voting and Democracy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1134 (2006) (stating that “the 
future looks bleak” for advocates of campaign speech
Oops! I Said it Again: Judicial Codes of Conduct, the First Amendment, and the Definition of 
Impartiality, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 733, 743–44 (2004); Brian Morris, Free Speech in 
Judicial Ele
Limits on Regulating Judicial Campaigns 2–3 (Loyola-LA Legal Studies Paper No. 2007-
5), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=954757 (last visited Dec. 31, 2007) (con-
cluding that most major judicial campaign speech regulations are “of uncertain con-
stitutionality” under White). 
98  Judge Rick A. Johnson, Judicial Campaign Speech in Kentucky After Republican 
Party of Minnesota v. White, 30 N. KY. L. REV. 347, 383–84 (2003) (quoting memo-
randum of Kentucky Judicial Conduct Commission). 
 99 See Brian S. Faughnan & Lucian T. Pera, Will Court’s New Rules Help Tennessee 
Judicial Candidates Deal with Aftershocks of ‘White’ Decision?, TENN. B.J., June 2006, at 14, 
20–21, 27.
 100 In re Amendment of Canon 7(B)(1)(c) of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 2002 
Pa. LEXIS 3194, at *1 (Pa. Nov. 21, 2002) (adopting commit clause as replacement). 
 101 Smith v. Phillips, No. CIV.A.A-02CV111, 2002 WL 1870038, at *1 (W.D. Tex. 
Aug. 6, 2002). 
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well beyond the announce clause.  Some states substantially trimmed 
the prohibitions imposed by their commit clause102 or pledge or 
promise clause.103  Others more drastically reduced their regulatio
ampaign speech.  North Carolina, for example, eliminated its 
pledges or promises clause, lifted its ban on candidates’ personal so-
licitation of campaign contributions, and excluded misleading state-
ments about a candidate’s opponent from its misrepresent clause.104
The ABA’s recent revisions to the Model Code also bear signs of 
grappling with the uncertain implications of White.  A manifest re-
sponse to White in the provisionally amended 2003 Code was to de-
fine “impartiality” and “impartial” as “absence of bias or prejudice in 
favor of, or against, particular parties or classes of parties, as well as 
maintaining an open mind in considering issues that may come be-
fore the judge.”105  In addition, the new Code merged the commit 
clause with the pledges or promises clause, and simultaneously tight-
ened the language of the latter.  In place of the earlier ban on 
pledges or promises of conduct in office “other than the faithful and 
impartial performance of the duties of the office,”106 the Code tar-
 
 102 See, e.g., CAL. CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 5B(1) (amended Dec. 22, 2003) 
(retaining ban on candidates’ statements “that commit the candidate with respect to 
cases, controversies, or issues that could come before the courts” but rescinding pro-
hibition on statements that “appear to commit” the candidate). 
 103 See, e.g., Approval of Amendments to the Tex. Code of Judicial Conduct, No. 
02-9167 (Tex. Aug. 22, 2002), available at http://www.supreme.cour s.t state.tx.us/ 
MiscDocket/02/02916700.pdf (replacing ban on pledges or promises regarding ju-
dicial duties “other than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the 
office” with prohibition regarding “pending or impending cases, specific classes of 
cases, or specific propositions of law that would suggest to a reasonable person that 
generally failed.  See Friedland, 
 does not adequately serve the interest of o-
ODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(d)(i) (1990) (amended 
the judge is predisposed to a probable decision within the scope of the pledge”). 
 104 See N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (amended Jan. 31, 2006).  In the same ac-
tion, the state also converted its admonition against “political activity inappropriate 
to [a judge’s] judicial office” to permission to “engage in political activity consistent 
with [a] judge’s status as a public official.”  Id.  For another instance of a state’s  re-
pealing major campaign speech restrictions, see Order Amending Preamble to 
Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct (Ga. Jan. 7, 2004), available at http://www.gasu 
preme.us/amended_rules/jqc_7_27_or.php (deleting Georgia’s pledges or promises 
clause).  In a contrary movement, legislators in a number of states initiated efforts to 
eliminate or curtail judicial elections; these efforts 
supra note 97, at 620 n.249 (summarizing attempts). 
 105 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Terminology (2003); see Hon. Howland W. 
Abramson & Gary Lee, The ABA Model Code Revisions and Judicial Campaign Speech: 
Constitutional and Practical Implications, 20 TOURO L. REV. 729, 733 (2004) (attributing 
change to attempt “to eliminate the possibility that a future court would hold, like 
the majority in White, that ‘impartiality
penmindedness.’”) (citation omitted).
  M106
2003). 
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gete
stric-
tions.  A number of these are discussed below,109 but the fate of White 
itself o  con-
fronted two pr  not been ad-
dres
logic is too narrow.  
Viewing White through its essential outlook on judicial campaign 
 
 
d “pledges, promises, or commitments” concerning “cases, con-
troversies, or issues . . . likely to come before the court” where such 
statements “ are inconsistent with the [judge’s] adjudicative duties.”107  
Changes approved in the 2007 Code mark a further retreat from ear-
lier restrictions, especially in the realm of political activities.  Under 
the new rules, candidates for judicial office in partisan elections may 
identify themselves as candidates of a political organization, seek en-
dorsements from political organizations, attend events sponsored by a 
political organization or candidate, establish a campaign committee, 
and communicate with the public through “any medium.”108
Most telling of White’s impact, however, has been lower courts’ 
receptiveness to attacks on other judicial campaign speech re
n remand illustrates the trend.  There, the Eighth Circuit
ovisions of Minnesota’s canons that had
sed by the Supreme Court.  The state’s partisan activities clause 
had prohibited judicial candidates from identifying themselves as 
members of political organizations, attending political gatherings, or 
using endorsements.110  Its solicitation clause had barred candidates 
from personally soliciting or accepting campaign contributions and 
from personally soliciting publicly stated support.111  Considered “in 
light of White,” both clauses were deemed to fail strict scrutiny.112
II. THE FORECAST FOR CAMPAIGN SPEECH RESTRICTIONS:  
REASONS TO EXPECT ULTIMATE DEFEAT 
Alternative modes of reading the White opinion can account for 
the diverse assessments of its meaning.  Parsed carefully, with empha-
sis on its qualifications and specific reach, the opinion implies toler-
ance of restrictions that lack the precise defects of the announce 
clause.  Extrapolation of the opinion’s central themes, on the other 
hand, points to a more ominous fate for most major campaign 
speech provisions.  This Part argues that the flaw of a legalistic inter-
pretation is not that it is illogical, but that its 
 107 Id. 
 108 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.2(B)–(C) (2007).
 109 See infra Part II.C. 
f Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 745 (8th Cir. 2005) (citation 
itation omitted). 
 110 Republican Party o
omitted). 
 111 Id. (c
 112 Id. at 766. 
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as the proper test.116  Even where strict scrutiny might be appropriate, 
 
speech produces a more realistic picture than the stitching together 
of hopeful constructions of isolated passages.  An understanding of 
the decision as signaling broader hostility toward campaign speech 
limitations is supported by the pattern of federal court rulings since 
White.  Moreover, the ideological sympathies of the Court’s majority 
appear to favor an expansive conception of judicial candidates’ First 
Amendment rights.  Should the Court thus deal harshly with other 
restrictions, White will join those decisions whose wider implications 
were plausibly resisted but ultimately confirmed. 
A. Competing Conceptions of White 
While the White Court was unequivocal in its rejection of the an-
nounce clause, a search for intimations of more tolerant positions on 
other restraints yields several possibilities.  First, of course, is the 
scope of the holding; addressing only the announce clause, the opin-
ion did not purport to resolve the validity of other provisions.113  In 
particular, the Court took pains to reserve questions concerning the 
commit clause114 and the pledges or promises clause.115  Nor did the 
Court rule that future restrictions would necessarily be subjected to 
strict scrutiny.  In reviewing the announce clause under that stan-
dard, the Court simply noted the parties’ acceptance of strict scrutiny 
the opinion contains indications that it would not inevitably prove fa-
tal.  For example, the Court cited two decisions that identified restric-
tio s on political speech deemed narn rowly tailored to serve a compel-
ling state interest.117  Moreover, the opinion left open a substantial 
range of interests that might qualify as compelling.  The Court ex-
pressly rejected only one of three meanings of “impartiality” as not 
 
 113 The Court declined to consider other restrictions on judicial campaign speech 
challenged by the plaintiffs.  See Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 534 U.S. 1054, 
1054 (2001) (confining grant of certiorari). 
 v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774 n.5 (2002) (“We do 
iffault, supra note 94, at 215 
s pledges or promises clause “is not challenged here.”  White, 536 U.S. 
). 
 114 See Republican Party of Minn.
not know whether the announce clause (as interpreted by state authorities) and the 
1990 ABA canon [the commit clause] are one and the same.  No aspect of our con-
stitutional analysis turns on this question.”); see also Br
(stating that “[i]t is highly implausible to suggest that ‘announce’ and ‘commit’ 
mean the same thing”). 
 115 The Court pointedly distinguished promises from announcements and noted 
that Minnesota’
at 780. 
 116 Id. at 774; see infra Part II.B.2. 
 117 See White, 536 U.S. at 775, 782 (citing Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45 (1982)); 
id. at 786 (citing Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992)); see also infra notes 160–75 
and accompanying text (discussing Brown and Burson
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reserved the formal possibility of heightened regulatory au-
thor
er government functions that its elections 
 
 
compelling,118  and did not foreclose consideration of other interests 
such as judicial independence119 and integrity.  Finally, the White ma-
jority p
ity in the sphere of judicial elections.  In response to Justice 
Ginsburg’s accusation that the majority had adopted a “unilocular, 
‘an election is an election,’ approach,”120 the Court declared that “we 
neither assert nor imply that the First Amendment requires cam-
paigns for judicial office to sound the same as those for legislative of-
fice.”121
In a sense, the doctrinal legacy of White rests on the meaning of 
this last disclaimer.  To hopeful supporters of regulation, the passage 
hints at a willingness to countenance restrictions that, unlike the an-
nounce clause, are closely tailored to interests at stake in judicial elec-
tions.  At least equally plausible, however, is a literal construction: 
viz., the case did not present an occasion for confronting whether 
speech principles developed for other elections must be generally 
imported into judicial races.122  That reading suggests the unprofita-
bility of combing the opinion to detect what restrictions might tech-
nically fit within its interstices.  In this view, the key to White’s signifi-
cance lies in its basic conception of judging and politics.  That 
conception, it appears, is of judicial decisionmaking as not so funda-
mentally different from oth
 118  or 
again
 120 536 U.S. at 805 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 121 536 U.S. at 783. 
 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), and 
 See 536 U.S. at 775–78 (finding that “lack of preconception in favor of
st a particular legal view” is not a compelling interest but declining to determine 
weight either of “lack of bias for or against either party” to an action or of “open-
mindedness”). 
 119 See J.J. GASS, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, AFTER WHITE: DEFENDING AND AMENDING 
CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS 8 (2004), http://www.brennancenter.org/resources/ 
ji/ji4.pdf (stating that while the White majority regarded the parties as having used 
“impartiality” and “independence” interchangeably, the two concepts “should not be 
conflated”) (citing White, 536 U.S. at 775 n.6). 
 122 A comparison of
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), provides an instructive exam-
ple of how hollow this kind of qualification can be.  Croson neither asserted nor im-
plied that racial classifications by the federal government would be scrutinized as 
harshly as those by state and local government; on the contrary, the opinions of Jus-
tices O’Connor and Scalia explicitly distinguished between the two levels of govern-
ment in considering action that distributes benefits and burdens based on race.  See 
Croson, 488 U.S. at 489–90; id. at 521–22 (Scalia, J., concurring).  Yet, Adarand—with 
the endorsement of both Justices—ruled that the Equal Protection Clause categori-
cally required the same level of scrutiny for all racial classifications.  Adarand, 515 
U.S. at 227 (holding that “all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, 
or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scru-
tiny”). 
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ucture. 
B. W it
Asid isclaimer, White betrays no consideration 
of m
c ed the heart of 
the majority’s reasoning in objecting that “[j]udges are not politi-
cians, and the First Amendment does not require that they be treated 
124
igns from becoming 
 
must be treated differently as well.  Rather, elections for judges are 
still at bottom elections, and judicial candidates can claim substantially 
the same First Amendment protection as other participants in the le-
gal arena.  If this interpretation is correct, then White was only the 
first phase of the dismantling of judicial campaign speech regula-
tion’s prevailing str
h e’s Denial of Judicial Exceptionalism 
e from its murky d
odifying First Amendment principles for judicial elections.  On 
the contrary, Justice Scalia’s opinion regards the state as accepting 
the ordinary operation of those principles when it chooses a system of 
elected judges.  The opinion finds nothing peculiar to the judicial 
enterprise that warrants lesser protection for judicial candidates’ 
speech.  This refusal to acknowledge judicial distinctiveness better 
explains the Court’s application of strict scrutiny than the parties’ 
stipulation to that standard.  The vigor with which the standard is ap-
plied further displays the scant relevance of the judicial context, and 
suggests that most other restrictions would fare little better than the 
announce clause. 
1. Judicial Candidates as Politicians Under the  
First Amendment 
Prior to White, Professor Chemerinsky argued that when a state 
“make[s] . . . judicial candidates into politicians by requiring them to 
run for office,” they should have “the same basic right to free speech 
as all others standing for election.”123  While the Court’s opinion did 
not embrace this position in so many words, its logic points over-
whelmingly in that direction.  Justice Ginsburg tou h
as politicians simply because they are chosen by popular vote.”   
Like the court below, she obviously sympathized with the aim of 
speech restrictions “to prevent judicial campa
routine political contests.”125  The Court, however, squarely re-
 
 123 Chemerinsky, Restrictions, supra note 9, at 735. 
 124 White, 536 U.S. at 821 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see Lippman, supra note 96, at 
140 (supporting campaign speech restrictions on ground that “a judge’s duties are 
wholly distinguishable from those of any politician”). 
inn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 880 (8th Cir. 2001); see also  125 Republican Party of M
Symposium, Recent Changes in the Law of Judicial Elections, 56 MERCER L. REV. 815, 820–
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ced immunity of judicial elections from “routine” First Amend-
ment tenets.  For the majority, imposition of speech restrictions for 
the campaign period “sets our First Amendment jurisprudence on its 
head.”126  A state’s decision to elect its judiciary entails acceptance of 
the broader constitutional conditions for all elections: “‘If the State 
chooses to tap the energy and the legitimizing power of the democ-
ratic process, it must accord the participants in that process . . . the 
First Amendment rights that attach to their roles.’”127
While Justice Scalia’s opinion did not draw on voting rights ju-
risprudence, the Court’s approach to elections under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause supplies an instructive parallel.  There, too, the Court 
confronted the state’s choice to elect candidates to an office that 
could have been made appointive.  Having chosen elections, the state 
is required to comply with the constitutional command of equality 
rather than withhold the franchise from those deemed insufficiently 
interested or qualified.128  It is true that the Court occasionally allows 
deviation from full equality for election to certain offices.129  In those 
instances, however, the Court contrasts the peculiarly narrow powers 
of the body involved to the more wide-ranging functions on which 
rigorous equality is premised.130  Justice Scalia in White, on the other 
hand, emphasized the similarities between judicial and legislative 
candidates for purposes of the First Amendment.131  He accused Jus-
21 (2005) [hereinafter Recent Changes] (asserting that “I have yet to talk to a practi-
tioner, a lawyer, a judge, or a policy specialist” who does not believe that the distinc-
tion between judicial and other elections is “a very great one”) (transcript remark of 
U.S. 621 (1969) (invalidating law 
410 U.S. 719 
9  on voting similar to those in Ball); see also Briffault, su-
r sh support for treating other 
eech restrictions differently from announce clause). 
andidate for Judicial Elec-
Barbara E. Reed).  But see Swanson, supra note 87, at 103 (criticizing White dissenters 
as advocating view that “[e]lection campaigns deform judges into vote-seeking politi-
cians”). 
 126 White, 536 U.S. at 781. 
 127 Id. at 788 (quoting Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 349 (1991) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting)). 
 128 See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 
that confined voting in school district elections to owners or lessees of taxable real 
property and parents or custodians of children in public schools). 
 129 See, e.g., Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 362–71 (1981) (upholding limitation of 
voting for directors of water district to landowners in proportion to number of acres 
owned); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 
(1 73) (upholding limitation
p a note 94, at 187–90 (arguing that such decisions furni
judicial campaign sp
 130 See, e.g., Salyer, 410 U.S. at 728. 
 131 Jacob McCrea, Comment, The First Amendment Allows a C
tion to Announce His or Her Views on Disputed Legal or Political Issues: Republican Party of 
Minnesota v. White, 41 DUQ.  L. REV. 425, 445 (2003) (endorsing White’s premise that 
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Ginsburg of “greatly exaggerat[ing] the difference between judi-
cial and legislative elections.”132  Far from standing aloof from “‘rep-
resentative government,’” he asserted, state-court judges participate 
through their power to “‘make’ common law” and to interpret state 
constitutions.133  Acting in this “policy making capacity,”134 judges play 
an integral role in the representative enterprise.135  While a state may 
wish them to act more disinterested than other policymakers, it as-
sumes the risk of real or perceived bias by subjecting them to elec-
tions.136
White makes clear, then, that judicial elections resemble other 
political contests enough to trigger the constitutional corollaries of 
the electoral process.  These preeminently include the right of can-
didates to convey, and voters to receive, information relevant to the 
electorate’s ability to make an informed choice.137  The opinion re-
cites an earlier pronouncement that “‘debate on the qualifications of 
candidates’ is ‘at the core of our electoral process and of the First 
Amendment freedoms.’”138  Thus, under the First Amendment, the 
state may not “leav[e] the principle of elections in place while pre-
venting candidates from discussing what the elections are about.”139  
Given the Court’s acknowledgement of judicial policy formulation, 
these princi
m  express their intentions and the platforms 
 
judicial candidates “are not sufficiently different” from others “to justify a broad, con-
tent-based restriction on their freedom of speech during an election”). 
s); see also Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 
l over the state’s judiciary undermines the 
a f interest in independent judiciary). 
r-
 132 White, 536 U.S. at 784. 
 133 Id. (quoting id. at 806 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)). 
 134 Id. 784 n.12. 
 135 See Snyder, supra note 48, at 244 (asserting that differences between judges and 
other public officials “ultimately . . . are a matter of degree”). 
 136 See White, 536 U.S. at 792 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that “[i]f the 
State has a problem with judicial impartiality, it is largely one the State brought upon 
itself” through the election of judge
F.3d 854, 886 (8th Cir. 2001) (Beam, J., dissenting) (indicating that Minnesotans’ 
repeated insistence on popular contro
st te’s assertion o
 137 See White, 536 U.S. at 782 (stating that “[w]e have never allowed the govern-
ment to prohibit candidates from communicating relevant information to voters du
ing an election”); accord Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 52–53 (1976) (stating that can-
didates for public office have a “right to engage in the discussion of public issues” 
and “to make their views known”). 
 138 White, 536 U.S. at 781 (quoting Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. 
Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 222–23 (1989)). 
 139 Id. at 788. 
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ly
 that standard had the parties’ support.  A 
stipulation that racial classifications receive rationality review, for ex-
 
 
didates for other offices appeal to voters.140  Just as the electorate will 
want to know a legislative candidate’s positions on the issues of the 
day, so too will it want to learn the views and values that would inform 
an aspiring judge’s exercise of discretion.141  And as the Court noted, 
its curiosity will not be satisfied by abstractions like the candidate’s 
commitment to “strict construction.”142  To a large measure, judicial 
elections “are about” the candidates’ differences on more specific 
question
2. The Sweeping Scope of Strict Scrutiny 
The formal ambiguity surrounding White’s broader framework 
includes the question of scrutiny.  The Court’s treatment of this issue 
bears quoting: “The Court of Appeals concluded that the proper test 
to be applied to determine the constitutionality of such a restriction 
is what our cases have called strict scrutiny; the parties do not dispute 
that this is correct.”144  On the surface, the opinion’s adoption of 
strict scrutiny thus appears merely contingent.  The opinion as a 
whole, however, points to the decision’s establishment of strict scru-
tiny as the standard of review for all restrictions on judicial campaign 
speech. 
To begin with, the Court’s brief explanation does not necessari  
mean that it applied strict scrutiny simply because the parties stipu-
lated to that standard.145  Textually and logically, the passage could 
well reflect the Court’s endorsement of strict scrutiny without elabo-
ration due to lack of contention on this question.  After all, it would 
seem curious even in this context for Justice Scalia to describe as 
“correct” a legal doctrine with which he disagreed.  It seems even 
more unlikely that the Court would apply a standard that it consid-
ered inappropriate because
 140 See Allen, supra note 89, at 226 (lamenting that with the White decision, “the 
judicial branch is becoming more like the executive and legislative branch [sic]”). 
 141 See Grodin, supra note 14, at 1975 (1988) (criticizing the concept of “the judge 
as Hercules, eschewing all ‘policy’ judgments, and searching out and applying objec-
tively ascertainable ‘principles’ inherent in the institutions and enactments of soci-
ety”); Morrison, supra note 54, at 732 (describing judge’s “basic values, principles, 
and preferences” as a “prism” through which a judge interprets authorities). 
 142 See White, 536 U.S. at 773. 
 143 Id. at 788. 
 144 Id. at 774 (citations omitted). 
 145 See In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1, 6 (N.Y. 2003) (arguing that the White Court “did 
not decide what level of review was applicable . . . but applied strict scrutiny because 
the parties agreed on that standard”). 
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speech150—so much so that Justice Ginsburg objected to the Court’s 
 
 
le, would hardly be binding on the Court.  On questions of fed-
eralism and separation of powers, the Court has not found decisive 
other branches’ mutual acceptance of the allocation of authority.146  
No obvious reason recommends itself for deferring to parties’ under-
standing of proper scrutiny.  Moreover, even if the Court were uncer-
tain and applied a standard assuming arguendo that it was correct, se-
lecting the most stringent review would clash with settled doctrines of 
constitutional adjudication.  Where a statute’s validity is in doubt, the 
Court has long favored paths that preserve the legislation;147 applica-
tion of strict scrutiny in the face of ambivalence toward review would 
depart from this principle. 
More broadly, the language of the opinion and the authority on 
which it rests reflect systemic adoption of strict scrutiny more than an 
ad hoc accession to the parties’ view.  At the ou
rt characterizes the announce clause as “prohibit[ing] speech
basis of its content and burden[ing] a category of speech th
e core of our First Amendment freedoms.’”148  This classifica
e implicates constitutional traditions conferring the highest l
rotection on speech.149  Indeed, the opinion relies heavily on 
ns involving heightened scrutiny of restrictions on politi
 146 See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182 (1992) (“Where Congress 
arture from the constitutional 
tions omit-
.S. 214 (1989) (invalidating state’s ban on political party 
exceeds its authority relative to the States . . . the dep
plan cannot be ratified by the ‘consent’ of state officials.”); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 
919, 946–48 (1983) (striking down legislative veto provisions as violating requirement 
of presentment regardless of whether the president approved the statute). 
 147 Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932) (describing as “cardinal principle” 
that in such circumstances the Court “will first ascertain whether a construction of 
the statute is fairly possible by which the [constitutional] question may be avoided”), 
cited in Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., con-
curring).
 148 536 U.S. at 774 (quoting Kelly, 247 F.3d at 863). 
 149 See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 661 (2004) (stating that the Constitution 
“demands that content-based restrictions on speech be presumed invalid, and that 
the government bear the burden of showing their constitutionality”) (cita
ted); United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (stating 
that since statute at issue is “a content-based speech restriction, it can stand only if it 
satisfies strict scrutiny”) (citation omitted); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) 
(stating that First Amendment “affords the broadest protection” to “[d]iscussion of 
public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates”); Monitor Patriot Co. v. 
Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 271 (1971) (stating that “it can hardly be doubted” that the First 
Amendment “has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of 
campaigns for political office”) (citation omitted); see generally ALEXANDER 
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948). 
 150 See, e.g., White, 536 U.S. at 775, 781 (citing Eu v. San Francisco County Democ-
ratic Cent. Comm., 489 U
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“unr tive 
and  Court’s response, while repeating that 
 fails strict scrutiny because it is woefully under-
s and its 
appearance,  and instead concluded that the real purpose of the 
announce clause is to undermine judicial elections.155  This explora-
tion of actual motive, usually avoided in free speech challenges,156 is 
best explained by the presumptive invalidity of content-based restric-
 
elenting reliance on decisions involving contests for legisla
executive posts.”151  The
judicial and legislative campaigns were not necessarily being equated, 
assumed the appropriateness of strict scrutiny: 
[E]ven if the First Amendment allows greater regulation of judicial 
election campaigns than legislative election campaigns, the an-
nounce clause still
inclusive . . . . We rely on the cases involving speech during elec-
tions only to make the obvious point that this underinclusiveness 
cannot be explained by resort to the notion that the First 
Amendment provides less protection during an election cam-
paign than at other times.152
The opinion thus allows the possibility that judicial campaign restric-
tions could entail consideration of distinctive interests, but does not 
retreat from strict scrutiny in conducting that calculus.  The strin-
gency of that review far outweighs any concession to the relevance of 
the judicial setting.153
White’s tenor bolsters the inference that it is adopting strict scru-
tiny for judicial campaign regulation generally.  A pronounced skep-
ticism of motive pervades the opinion.  The Court mocked the argu-
ment that the state seeks to foster openmindednes
154
 
endorsements of primary candidates)); Id. at 775, 782 (citing Brown v. Hartlage, 456 
U.S. 45 (1982) (overturning state’s nullification of election victory on grounds of 
candidate’s impermissible campaign promises)); Id. at 782 (citing Wood v. Georgia, 
370 U.S. 375 (1962) (reversing contempt conviction for criticism of grand jury inves-
ction)); Id. at 785, 787 (citingtigation of alleged racial bloc voting in primary ele
s Comm‘n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (i
 
nvalidating statute ban-McIntyre v. Ohio Election
ning distribution of anonymous political campaign literature)); Id. at 786 (citing 
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (involving ban on campaigning within 100 
feet of a polling place)). 
 151 Id. at 806 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
152  Id. at 783 (majority opinion) (citation omitted). 
 153 See Buckley v. Ill. Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 228 (7th Cir. 1993) (ac-
knowledging that judges “remain different from legislators and executive officials . . . 
in ways that bear on the strength of the state’s interest in restricting their freedom of 
speech” while invalidating state’s announce clause and pledges or promises clause). 
 154 See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text. 
 155 See 536 U.S. at 782. 
 156 See City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 292 (2000); United States v. 
O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382–83 (1968). 
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willin
ict in theory but fatal in fact.”   The Court’s cita-
tion to two cases that describe means by which speech descriptions 
can some credence to this position.  As 
White
 
157 nder strict scrutiny.  Nor does the
gness to conduct a probing review will be confined to its consid-
eration of the announce clause in that case.  Indeed, courts since 
White have widely assumed the applicability of strict scrutiny to a vari-
ety of restrictions on judicial campaign speech.158  Their belief further 
supports this construction as the natural reading of White. 
3. Strict Scrutiny’s Devastating Effect 
Even assuming strict scrutiny, defenders of judicial campaign 
speech restrictions can argue that the White Court did not intend that 
standard to be “str 159
survive strict scrutiny lends 
 itself demonstrates, however, regulation of judicial candidates’ 
expression can generally be distinguished from the circumstances set 
forth in those opinions.  More importantly, the key analytical ele-
ments of White’s brand of scrutiny bode ill for most attempts to limit 
campaign speech. 
a. Unhelpful Precedent 
The Court in White perhaps unavoidably acknowledged its earlier 
decision in Burson v. Freeman.160  Applying strict scrutiny, the Burson 
Court found that Tennessee’s ban on election-day campaigning 
around polling places was narrowly tailored to its compelling interests 
in shielding voters from “confusion and undue influence” and in pro-
 
 157 See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 812–13 (2000); 
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). 
 158 See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 749 (8th Cir. 2005) 
(applying strict scrutiny to prohibitions on certain partisan activities and personally 
soliciting campaign contributions); Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 
2002) (applying strict scrutiny to misrepresentation clause a dn  bans on solicitation of 
campaign funds and publicly stated support); Kan. Judicial Watch v. Stout, 440 F. 
Supp. 2d 1209, 1229–31, 1236–38  (D. Kan. 2006) (applying strict scrutiny to pledges 
r signatures on nomination petitions); N.D. 
 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 
g evidence that can support a speech restriction subject to strict scrutiny.”  
e elly, 247 F.3d 854, 879 (8th Cir. 2001). 
or promises clause, commit clause, and provisions restricting solicitation of campaign 
contributions, publicly stated support, o
Family Alliance, Inc. v. Bader, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1036 (D. N.D. 2005) (applying 
strict scrutiny to commit and pledges or promises clauses). 
 159 White, 416 F.3d at 786 & n.25 (8th Cir. 2005) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 160 504 U.S. 191 (1992), cited in
786 (2002).  The Eighth Circuit pointed to Burson as “an example of the type of cor-
roboratin
R publican Party of Minn. v. K
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romises made by a candidate to voters . . . may be 
decl
that (unbeknownst to the candidate) state law would have barred him 
from fulfilling.169  Furthermore, the example of a proscribable prom-
ise furnished in Brown—to provide payment in exchange for 
 
ng the “integrity and reliability” of the electoral process.161  In dis-
tinguishing that outcome, the White Court did not argue that Tennes-
see’s restriction on campaign speech presented a much closer fit be-
tween means and end than Minnesota’s announce clause.  Instead, 
the opinion emphasized an aspect of Tennessee’s prohibition that 
the Burson majority had not: viz., the longstanding existence and 
widespread adoption of such bans.162  The Court’s reliance on this 
distinction has ominous implications for much judicial campaign 
regulation.  While the announce clause suffered from a lack of both 
popularity and longevity,163 other restrictions seem likely to suffer at 
least from the latter failing.  In the Court’s depiction, the “practice of 
prohibiting speech by judicial candidates on disputed issues”—a 
category that could be taken to include the pledges or promises and 
commit clauses—“is neither long nor universal.”164
Language from another case mentioned by the White Court, 
Brown v. Hartlage,165 offers comparably meager support to advocates of 
campaign speech limitations.  The Court in Brown did acknowledge 
that “some kinds of p
ared illegal without constitutional difficulty.”166  However, that is 
not the proposition for which Justice Scalia cited the decision in 
White.  Rather, his opinion invoked Brown for its articulation of strict 
scrutiny167 and disapproval of governmental attempts to dictate the 
agenda of political campaigns.168  Moreover, the passage quoted has 
direct relevance only to the pledges or promises clause, and even 
there its potency is diluted by its status as dicta.  In fact, the holding 
in Brown militates against restrictions; the Court overturned a state’s 
voiding of an election based on the victor’s having made a pledge 
 
  Burson, 504 U.S. at 198–99
162 04 U.S. at 214–1
161 . 
  Burson, 5
786–87. 
6 (Scalia, J., concurring), cited in White, 536 U.S. at 
 163 White, 536 U.S. at 786. 
 164 Id. at 785. 
 165 456 U.S. 45 (1982); White, 536 U.S. at 775, 782 (citing Brown). 
 166 Brown, 456 U.S. at 55. 
 167 White, 536 U.S. at 775 (citing Brown, 456 U.S. at 45, 54). 
 168 White, 536 U.S. at 782 (citing Brown, 456 U.S. at 60). 
 169 Brown, 456 U.S. at 60–62. 
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susta d others have also 
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that preventing bias for or against a party qualifies as compel-
ling,  
 
votes170—is far removed from the central concerns of the pledges or 
promises clause.171
Finally, Justice Scalia’s opinion implicitly dismisses the signifi-
cance of one other line o
ns.  The Eighth Circuit looked to 
ining limits on campaign contributions,172 an
ed that the rationale of those holdings similarly supports limita-
tions on judicial campaign expression.173  The Court in White did not 
trouble to rebut this analogy, but doubtless could have done so.  For 
example, it could have found that the actual and perceived corrup-
tion spawned by unrestrained campaign donations finds no counter-
part in the effects of judicial candidates’ representations.174  To the 
extent that tension exists between these doctrines, however, it seems 
likely that the Court’s protection of freedom to participate in political 
campaigns will prevail.175
b. The Slim Roster of Compelling Interests 
White displays both a narrow conception of impartiality and resis-
tance to treating other interests as compelling.  The prospects of a 
campaign speech limitation at issue are therefore clouded even be-
fore the question of narrow tailoring is considered.  While the Court 
implied 
176 the opinion takes a strenuously literal view of that interest. 
Justice Scalia emphatically distinguished between bias toward parties 
and bias concerning issues,177 and left no doubt that a candidate was 
entitled to exhibit the latter.  Although a party advancing a position 
 
 170 Id. at 54. 
 171 See infra Part III.B. 
aleo, 424 U.S. 1 
. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659–60 (1990); Buck-
y
 172 Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 878–79  (8th Cir. 2001) (cit-
ing Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000); Buckley v. V
(1976) (per curiam)); see also Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 
652 (1990) (upholding prohibition on use of corporate funds to support or oppose 
any candidate for state office). 
 173 See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 94, at 190, 201–02, 212–13, 225, 228, 231–32.  In 
addition to the cases noted at supra note 172, Briffault discusses McConnell v. FEC, 
4 ), decided the term after White. 5 0 U.S. 93 (2003
 174 See Austin v
le , 424 U.S. at 26–27 (per curiam); Friedland, supra note 97, at 611. 
 175 See Ronald D. Rotunda, Judicial Elections, Campaign Financing, and Free Speech, 2 
ELECTION L.J. 79, 80–81 (2003) (suggesting that White “casts a long shadow” over cam-
paign finance laws). 
 176 See White, 536 U.S. at 775–76 (noting cases in which impartiality in the sense of 
judge’s lacking this bias was found “essential to due process”). 
 177 Id. at 776. 
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adverse to that taken by the judge as a candidate can anticipate defeat 
of that position, this result does not show animosity or favoritism to-
ward a particular party; “[a]ny party taking that position is just as 
likely to lose.”178  The Court thus effectively rejected the argument 
that a judicial candidate’s stance on an issue can amount to bias 
against parties because it implies prejudice agains
s.179
The White Court seemed equally disinclined to regard the ap-
pearance of impartiality, however understood, as a freestanding com-
pelling interest.  Rather, any stake in maintaining that interest seems 
strictly derivative of the substantive interest with which the image of 
impartiality is associated.  After determining that lack of preconcep-
tion toward a legal view did not deserve recognition as a compelling 
interest, the Court dismissively rejected the state’s interest in the ap-
pearance of such neutrality; there would be no point in “pretending” 
that this type of impartiality is worthy of preservation.180  In contrast, 
the dissenting opinions dwelt on the importance of “the public’s con-
fidence in the integrity and impartiality” of the courts181 and of their 
“reputation for impartiality and openmindedness.”182
The prospects for reliance on judicial independence as a com-
pelling interest are apparently likewise dim.  First, it is not even clear 
that the White majority considered independence to be a discrete in-
terest apart from impartiality.  At least in the litigation before it, the 
Court perceived the two terms as employed interchangeably.183  Even 
if judicial independence is granted to exist separate and distinct from 
impartiality,184 the Court is unlikely to ascribe much weight to th
 in this context.   Justice Scalia’s
 178 Id. at 777. 
 179 See id. at 799–800 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (advancing this argument); GASS, su-
pra note 119, at 6–7 (offering example that “[a] woman in a custody battle standing 
before a judge who declared in his election campaign that ‘men get too many raw 
deals in custody rulings’ cannot be comforted by the thought that this is merely a 
pra note 97, at 7 (suggesting that a  judicial candidate’s 
its ‘greed’ in producing a defective prod-
c  by distinction between party bias and issue 
el, Note, Losing Faith in the System: Unfettered Political Speech of 
nminded Judiciary After Republican Party of 
bias ‘on an issue’”); Morris, su
“promising to make a corporation pay for 
u t” is problematic but may be protected
bias). 
 180 White, 536 U.S. at 778. 
 181 Id. at 817 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 182 Id. at 802 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 183 See id. at 775 n.6 (majority opinion). 
 184 See supra notes 118–22 and accompanying text. 
 185 Cf. Dale A. Ried
Judicial Candidates Fails to Assure an Ope
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s has conceded that it is dubious to single out judges’ integrity 
as re
ness. 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence hints at why speech restrictions 
 
has already compromised, if not forfeited, a strong interest in judicial 
independence by holding judges accountable to voters.  For example, 
he rejects the argument that the announce clause shields judges from 
compulsion to conform their rulings to campaign pronouncements, 
observing that “elected judges—regardless of whether they have an-
nounced any views beforehand—always face the pressure of an elec-
torate who might disagree with their rulings and therefore vote them 
off the bench.”186  Nor should proponents of restrictions expect the 
Court’s to be receptive of arguments invoking other interests such as 
judicial integrity.  Even a notable defender of campaign speech re-
straint
quiring protection through curbs on political expression.187
c. The Alternative of Recusal 
As noted earlier, the White Court did not determine the weight 
of the state’s interest in judicial openmindedness because the an-
nounce clause did not seem designed to achieve that purpose.188  The 
opinion’s sparse references to the nature of this interest offer little 
encouragement that the Court would consider it compelling.  Justice 
Scalia characterized this meaning of impartiality as “not a common 
one,” and allowed only that openmindedness and its appearance 
“may well be . . . desirable in the judiciary.”189  Even assuming that 
openmindedness qualifies as compelling, however, it would be diffi-
cult to craft campaign speech restrictions narrowly tailored to serve 
that interest.  Two obstacles in particular stand in the way: the avail-
ability of disqualification or recusal as a less restrictive alternative, 
and the dilemma posed by the Court’s approach to underinclusive-
may be found unnecessary to foster openmindedness or any other in-
terest championed by the state.  While spurning state attempts to 
“censor what the people hear” about judicial candidates, Justice Ken-
nedy recognized its power to “adopt recusal standards more rigorous 
than due process requires.”190  Under this line of reasoning, even the 
 
Minnesota v. White, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 421, 437 (2003) (citing instances of 
Court’s recognizing importance of judicial independence in other contexts). 
 186 536 U.S. at 782. 
 187 See Briffault, supra note 94, at 220. 
 188 See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text. 
 189 536 U.S. at 778. 
 190 Id. at 794 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Traditionally, “recusal” refers to a judge’s 
voluntary removal from a case, while “disqualification” results from a party’s motion 
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l and disqualification 
can be hazy,192 parties may be deterred from seeking reassignment by 
fear a f liberal 
disqu
 
suppression of campaign expression deemed incompatible with 
openmindedness or its appearance would not pass strict scrutiny.  In-
stead, a judge whose campaign statement betrayed implacable bias 
could be replaced by an openminded judge as an alternative less re-
strictive of speech.191  Admittedly, recusal may operate as a less than 
ideal solution.  The standards governing recusa
of lienating the judge if unsuccessful, and a regime o
alification could generate substantial costs.193  Moreover, provi-
sions patterned after the ABA Model Code, disqualifying a judge 
from a case if the judge’s impartiality “might reasonably be ques-
tioned,”194 may be challenged on grounds of overbreadth195 or chill-
ing political expression196 if applied to campaign speech.  Still, courts 
since White have cited the availability of recusal as obviating the need 
for speech restrictions,197 while recusal provisions like that in the 
Model Code have withstood facial challenges.198
 
to require the judge’s removal.  RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: 
RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES 4–5 (1996).  Justice Kennedy apparently 
used “recusal” to encompass both actions; this Article uses the term in both senses 
according to context. 
, Tough 
earch “campaign conduct”) (stat-
(A) (1990) (amended 2003). 
as made any “public statement that commits, or appears to 
ntroversy” in a case is impermis-
 191 See Friedland, supra note 97, at 613–14; see also Joanna Cohn Weiss, Note
on Crime: How Campaigns for State Judiciary Violate Criminal Defendants’ Due Process 
Rights, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1101, 1126–35 (2006) (arguing for mandatory recusal in 
criminal cases of judges who conducted “tough-on-crime” election campaigns); In re 
Enforcement of Rule 2.03, Canon 5.B(1)(c), Campaign Conduct (Mo. July 18, 2002) 
(en banc), available at http://www.courts.mo.gov (s
ing that recusal or disqualification may be required “in cases that involve an issue 
about which the judge has announced his or her views”). 
 192 See MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS § 
9.06 (2d ed. 2002).
 193 See Friedland, supra note 97, at 614. 
 194 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.12
 195 See Abramson & Lee, supra note 105, at 733–34; see also Matthew D. Besser, 
Note, May I Be Recused?  The Tension Between Judicial Campaign Speech and Recusal After 
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1197, 1218–25 (2003) (ar-
guing that judges are not required to recuse themselves from cases involving issues 
that they permissibly addressed during campaign). 
 196 See Matthew J. Medina, Note, The Constitutionality of the 2003 Revisions to Canon 
3(E) of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1072, 1073, 1102–07 
(2004) (arguing that the provision in the 2003 ABA Model Code requiring disquali-
fication of a judge who h
commit, the judge with respect to” an “issue” or “co
sibly overbroad and vague) (citation omitted). 
 197 See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 755 (8th Cir. 2005); 
Kan. Judicial Watch v. Stout, 440 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1231, 1234–35 (D. Kan. 2006); 
N.D. Family Alliance, Inc. v. Bader, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1042 (D.N.D. 2005); 
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d. Underinclusiveness and the Overbreadth Quandary 
Even if legal and practical barriers undermine recusal’s utility, 
another aspect of the White Court’s reasoning will likely thwart restric-
tions intended to safeguard against threats to openmindedness.  As 
noted earlier, the incongruity between the aim of ensuring open-
mindedness and the scope of Minnesota’s ban on announcing views 
left the Court unwilling to ascribe this purpose to the rule.199  In bar-
ring announcements “only at certain times and in certain forms,”200 
the rule left judges and aspiring judges free to state their views in a 
wide range of forums similarly incompatible with judicial openmind-
edness.201  The condemnation of underinclusiveness here contrasts 
with a more tolerant approach taken by the Court elsewhere.202  In 
particular, the Court rejected the contention that the ban’s selectivity 
was justified by the uniquely heightened threat to openmindedness 
posed by campaign statements.203
This robust notion of underinclusiveness augurs poorly for other 
restrictions, especially the commit clause.  Like the announce clause, 
the commit clause targets statements during the campaign while al-
lowing expressions of commitment outside the period of candidacy.204  
In addition, although White did not address the commit clause, its 
 
Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm’n on Judicial Conduct, 244 F. Supp. 2d 72, 88–89 
(N.D.N.Y. 2003), rev’d on other grounds, 351 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 198 See, e.g., Ala. Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Feldman, 380 F. Supp. 2d 
., Inc. v. Wolnitzek, 345 F. Supp. 2d 672, 
S. 43, 51–53 (1994); City Council v. Taxpayers 
to the Pennsylvania 
udicial Elections?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 911, 
4
467 (stating that the commitment clause “does not 
as ude within its prohibitions persons who have or will 
o emselves to issues before and after a judicial election”). 
1080, 1083–84 (D. Ala.  2005); N.D. Family Alliance, Inc., 361 F. Supp. 2d at 1036 
(D.N.D. 2005); Family Trust Found. of Ky
705–10 (E.D. Ky. 2004). 
 199 See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text. 
 200 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 783 (2002). 
 201 See id. at 779–80; see also Snyder, supra note 48, at 230 (objecting that restriction 
of campaign speech “prohibits one type of public pronouncement of judicial candi-
dates but ignores numerous other types of public pronouncements that may have 
equal or greater impact on judicial impartiality”). 
 202 See, e.g., Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.
for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 810–11 (1984). 
 203 White, 536 U.S. at 780–81; see S. Graham Simmons III, Note, “I am Pro-Choice, 
Pro-Union and I Oppose Capital Punishment—I Want You to Elect Me 
Supreme Court”: Is this the Future of Pennsylvania’s J
9 8 (2003) (asserting that “[o]ne cannot truly expect to preserve public confidence 
in judicial impartiality when judges are prohibited from announcing their views on 
divisive issues solely during election campaigns”).  But see Bogard, supra note 91, at 14 
(asserting that statements made “during the heat of a campaign” are “light years away 
from those made at any other time”).
  See Begaye, supra note 96, at 204
c t the net wide enough to incl
c mmit th
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ecial danger to openmindedness.208  
Besid
 
prospects appear darkened by Justice Scalia’s choice of words in un-
derlining the incomplete reach of the announce clause: “Before they 
arrive on the bench . . . judges have often committed themselves on le-
gal issues that they must later rule upon.”205  Bans on partisan activi-
ties during a campaign appear similarly susceptible to charges of un-
derinclusiveness.206  The pledges or promises clause, on the other 
hand, may be somewhat less vulnerable to this attack; the White Court 
granted the possibility that promissory statements during a campaign 
may carry a special resonance with voters.207  Even that concession, 
however, hardly amounted to an unqualified endorsement.  Rather, 
the Court acknowledged that it “might be plausible, perhaps,” that 
campaign promises present a sp
es other potential problems with the pledges or promises 
clause,209 it is not hard to envision the Court’s identifying promises 
beyond the clause’s proscription that arguably jeopardize openmind-
edness.  For example, the clause does not forbid expression by third 
parties that could be construed as a pledge on behalf of a candidate 
to rule in a particular way.  Of course, pledges or promises by third 
parties presumably do not bind a candidate in the public’s eyes as 
firmly as do the candidates’ own statements.  However, given the 
White Court’s cynical view of campaign promises—“the least binding 
form of human commitment”210—that difference might be consid-
ered slight.211  Moreover, experience with political advertisements by 
“independent” committees does not encourage confidence in voters’ 
ability to distinguish between statements authorized by a candidate 
and those sponsored by others.212
 
 205 White, 536 U.S. at 779 (emphasis added). 
 206 See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 758 (8th Cir. 2005) (find-
ing underinclusive a regulation “requiring a candidate to sweep under the rug his 
overt association with a political party for a few months during a judicial campaign, 
after a lifetime of commitment to that party”); Begaye, supra note 96, at 470 (assert-
ing that the political activity clause suffers from the same type of underinclusiveness 
as Minnesota’s announce clause). 
 207 See White, 416 F.3d at 780. 
g the distinction between candidate 
 208 Id. 
 209 See infra Part III.B. 
 210 536 U.S. at 780. 
 211 Gillers, supra note 46, at 732–33 (disputin
speech and speech of third parties as grounds for restricting judicial candidates’ 
freedom to speak about particular legal issues). 
 212 See Eric W. Groenendyk & Nicholas A. Valentino, Of Dark Clouds and Silver Lin-
ings: Effects of Exposure to Issue Versus Candidate Advertising on Persuasion, Information Re-
tention, and Issue Salience, COMMC’N RES., June 2002, at 295, 299; David B. Magleby, 
Dictum Without Data: The Myth of Issue Advocacy and Party Building (2001), 
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dth.  
The White opinion’s examples of relevant speech, untouched by the 
e impossibility of widely banning threats to 
open
derinclusive for failure to cover third parties as noted above, expand-
ing the clause’s scope to encompass those promises would raise seri-
u
 
A finding of underinclusiveness is devastating for judicial cam-
paign speech restrictions because the theoretical cure for this defect 
is not available in practice.  In principle, underinclusiveness can be 
remedied by the imposition of a more comprehensive restriction.  
With judicial campaigning, however, extending restraints on candi-
dates’ speech would inevitably produce impermissible overbrea
announce clause, show th
mindedness without infringing heavily on protected expression.  
As the Court noted, the clause left judicial candidates free to an-
nounce their views on legal issues in books, speeches, classes that they 
teach, and—in the case of sitting judges—even prior judicial opin-
ions.  It is inconceivable, of course, that a state could forbid or even 
contemplate forbidding all these modes of expression.  Indeed, in 
the case of the announce clause, it would be impossible to expunge 
statements of views that a judicial candidate innocently made prior to 
pursuing office.  Likewise, it would be absurd to require of judicial 
candidates either that they had never engaged in partisan activity or 
that they somehow retroactively repudiate such behavior.  Again, the 
case for the pledges or promises clause is somewhat closer; candidates 
would presumably issue no meaningful promises before launching 
their campaign.  However, if the Court did find even that clause un-
o s First Amendment concerns.  Thus, most, if not all, significant 
restrictions on judicial campaign speech will likely be caught between 
the Scylla of overinclusivness and the Charybdis of overbreadth.213
 
http://csed.byu.edu/Publications/Dictum.doc, at 1, 11 (finding that audience’s 
“clear perception is that election issue ads come from candidates or parties and not 
from interest groups”). 
 213 The quandary arising from White’s approach to underinclusiveness resembles 
the implications of criticism of a race-conscious admissions program by dissenters in 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).  In an opinion expressing the views of four of 
the five justices in the White majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist voiced incredulity that 
the University of Michigan Law School’s attention to race and ethnicity could be ex-
plained by its professed goal of achieving “critical mass” for underrepresented mi-
norities in its student body.  Id. at 379 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Scalia, Kennedy, 
and Thomas, J.J., dissenting).  As proof, he pointed to marked disparities over a six-
year period in the number of African-American, Hispanic, and Native American ap-
plicants admitted to the school.  Id. at 381–86.  In a sense, the dissenters regarded 
itted African-American applicants during 
failure to extend the relatively generous admission of African-Americans to the latter 
two groups as tellingly “underinclusive.”  At the same time, however, it is unimagin-
able that these justices would have approved a commitment to admitting all three 
groups in numbers similar to those of adm
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C. Lower Court Auguries 
Commentators who favor restrictions on judicial campaign 
speech can indulge their optimism about the possibilities for re-
straints conceivably left by White.  Judges confronted with actual cases 
and the prospect of reversal, however, must take a clear-eyed look at 
the underlying message of that decision.  In federal courts, they have 
overwhelmingly found challenged restrictions to violate White’s com-
mand.  While consensus among federal courts does not inevitably 
presage Court holdings,214 there is no reason here to believe that 
lower courts have routinely misread the White Court’s intent.  Rather,
this striking pattern reinforces the logical interpretation of Justice 
Scalia’s opinion as signaling broad opposition to limitations on judi-
cial candidates’ speech.  As already noted, lower courts have generally 
embraced the most speech-protective interpretations of White: cate-
gorical strict scrutiny,215 reliance on recusal as a substitute for limiting 
speech,216 and rigorous application of the underinclusiveness doc-
trine.217  This searching review has resulted in the invalidation of nu-
merous state campaign provisions: the commit clause,218 the pledges 
or promises clause,219 the solicitation clause,220 the partisan activities 
clause,221 and the misrepresentation clause.222  The adverse tenor of 
 
that period.  Instead, such an admissions policy would doubtless have been con-
demned as an invalid “quota.”  See, e.g., id. at 389 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (equating 
“critical mass” with “quotas”).  Thus, in both settings a strong version of underinclu-
siveness appears to place the state in a pincer between going too far and not going 
Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 
e supra Part II.B.3.c. 
la. Right 
f Ky., Inc. v. Wolnitzek, 345 F. Supp. 2d 672, 696–704 (E.D. Ky. 
upp. 2d at 1080, 
; Wolnitzek, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 696–704. 
rty of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 763–66 (8th Cir. 
2002); Stout, 440 F. 
ial Conduct, 244 F. Supp. 2d 72, 
far enough. 
 214 See, e.g., Cent. Bank of 
(1994) (rejecting unanimous view of eleven courts of appeals that § 10(b) of the Se-
curities and Exchange Act of 1934 authorizes private actions for aiding and abetting 
in violation of the section’s prohibitions). 
 215 See supra Part II.B.2. 
 216 Se
 217 See supra Part II.B.3.d. 
 218 See, e.g., Kan. Judicial Watch v. Stout, 440 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1228–35; A
to Life Political Action Comm. v. Feldman, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1083 (D. Ala.  
2005); N.D. Family Alliance, Inc. v. Bader, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1042 (D.N.D. 2005); 
Family Trust Found. o
2004). 
 219 See, e.g., Stout, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 1228–35; Feldman, 380 F. S
1083; Bader, 361 F. Supp. 2d at 1042
 220 See, e.g., Republican Pa
2005); Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1319–23 (11th Cir. 
Supp. 2d at 1235–38. 
 221 See, e.g., Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm’n on Judic
88–90 (N.D.N.Y.), rev’d on other grounds, 351 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 222 Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1319–22. 
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 New York Court of Appeals sustained the 
constitutionality of the state’s pledges or promises clause224 and po-
reme Court 
simi es to its commit clause and pledges or prom-
ises 
greater weight. 
 
these courts’ decisions often highlights their dissatisfaction with the 
restrictions before them.  On remand, for example, the Eighth Cir-
cuit found that Minnesota’s solicitation and political activities clauses 
operated not just to dampen but to “kill” rights of association and po-
litical speech.223
It is true that some courts have not shied from enforcing cam-
paign limitations since White; the source of this support, however, of-
fers small comfort to proponents of restrictions.  In a pair of compan-
ion cases, the
litical activities clause.225  Shortly before, the Florida Sup
larly denied challeng
clause.226  The obvious link among these holdings is that, in con-
trast to the above-cited decisions invalidating restrictions, they were 
issued by state supreme courts.227  Of course, the determinations of 
state court judges are not inherently suspect when they clash with 
those of federal counterparts.  In this instance, however, a sound ba-
sis exists for crediting the federal judiciary with a more dispassionate 
view of constitutional doctrine.  State high courts typically promul-
gate the very canons of judicial conduct whose legitimacy they adju-
dicate,228 as occurred in the New York and Florida cases.229  It would 
be natural for them to confer an exceptionally high presumption of 
validity on their handiwork.  Federal courts, on the other hand, have 
no such psychological or institutional investment in the campaign 
speech restraints that they review.  Accordingly, their nearly uniform 
rejection of restrictions since White should receive comparatively 
 
 223 White, 416 F.3d at 746. 
 224 In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1, 5–8 (N.Y. 2003) (per curiam). 
 225 In re Raab, 793 N.E.2d 1287, 1290–93 (N.Y. 2003). 
226  In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77, 85–87 (Fla. 2003). 
 227 See also In re Dunleavy, 838 A.2d 338, 351 (Me. 2003) (Maine Supreme Judicial 
Court’s upholding a provision forbidding sitting judges to solicit support for political 
candidates or purchasing tickets to political dinners or functions). 
 228 See James Duke Cameron, The Inherent Power of a State’s Highest Court to Discipline 
the Judiciary, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 45, 52–53 (1977). 
 229 See In re Code of Judicial Conduct, 643 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 1994); N.Y. RULES OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT (codified at N.Y. COMP. R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 100 (2006)). 
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ing more pretentious,”234 a full understanding of the law of campaign 
speech codes will include consideration of this possibility.235
 
D. The Majority’s Hostility to Campaign Speech Restrictions:  
A Realistic Assessment 
One of the striking features of Justice Scalia’s opinion in White is 
his uncharacteristic230 observation that judges actively shape law.231  
While this acknowledgement supports allowing judicial candidates to 
share their views with voters, it also invites inquiry into how the Jus-
tices’ own views might influence doctrine in this area.  Much com-
mentary on differences over campaign speech restrictions is couched 
in elegant terms of competing analytical models.232  However, an ex-
amination of the main beneficiaries of liberalized campaign codes 
suggests that personal preferences may help to account for some Jus-
tices’ stance on speech restrictions.  Specifically, removal of restraints 
on campaigning predominantly favors conservative causes to which a 
number of Justices may be sympathetic.  The thesis of this Article 
does not hinge on this explanation.  However, if correct, this hy-
pothesis reinforces other evidence that most significant restrictions 
will ultimately fail.  Though it is arguably unseemly to engage in such 
speculative nose-counting, the exercise belongs to the same tradition 
of legal realism233 that Justice Scalia invoked to recognize judicial 
policymaking.  If law is—to quote an early articulation of this tradi-
tion—”[t]he prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and noth-
 
 230 Justice Scalia has championed the view that judges should interpret law by con-
sulting objective sources rather than injecting their personal views.  See, e.g., Antonin 
REV. 53, 55 (2006) (arguing that split among Justices in White 
list” approach to free speech analysis with dissent-
R., AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM: SKEPTICISM, 
E
Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CINN. L. REV. 849, 863–64 (1989) (arguing in 
favor of originalism as method of interpreting Constitution on ground that it “estab-
lishes a historical criterion that is conceptually quite separate from the preferences of 
the judge himself”). 
 231 See supra notes 133–36 and accompanying text. 
 232 See, e.g., Michael Richard Dimino, Sr., Counter-Majoritarian Power and Judges’ Po-
litical Speech, 58 FLA. L. 
can be explained by sharply clashing approaches to the “counter-majoritarian diffi-
culty”); Sparling, supra note 96, at 445, 455 (characterizing debate between majority 
and dissenters over appearance of impartiality as clash between “revisionist” and 
“traditionalist” camps); Leading Cases, 116 HARV. L. REV. 200, 276–78 (2002) (con-
trasting majority’s “antifunctiona
ers’ “functionalist” approach). 
 233 See generally WILFRED E. RUMBLE, J
R FORM, AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1968). 
 234 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 
(1897). 
 235 Notwithstanding Justice Scalia’s formalism, see supra note 230, his authorship 
of the Court’s opinion in White makes this investigation perhaps particularly apt.  Jus-
tice Scalia obviously believes that constitutional interpretation can be heavily influ-
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may amount to criticism,237 but the majority 
opin
 
Although White was perceived in some quarters as an attack on 
judicial elections themselves,236 close inspection of the decision does 
not support this interpretation.  Justice O’Connor’s review of the 
dangers of elections 
ion that she joined does not question the integrity of the prac-
tice.  On the contrary, it was the announce clause’s “election-
nullifying effect”238 that rendered this restriction defective.  Formally 
agnostic on the mode of selecting judges, the Court was adamant 
about the ground rules for elections in the states that choose to con-
duct them.  Given persistent voter sentiment to retain elective judge-
ships,239 the holding had the effect of aiding groups that would bene-
fit from a less inhibited style of judicial campaigning.  As described 
below, these have typically been groups that would generally be re-
garded as conservative.240  Whether this correlation has influenced 
Justices’ positions on judicial candidates’ rights is of course a matter 
of conjecture.241  The phenomenon of recurring challenges to cam-
paign speech restraints by advocates of conservative interests, how-
ever, is unmistakable. 
It is widely agreed that White galvanized special interest groups to 
press judicial candidates for their positions on controversial issues.242  
In principle, these efforts could be waged by organizations of all ideo-
logical stripes; in practice, they have overwhelmingly involved groups 
of a decidedly conservative cast.  In North Dakota Family Alliance, Inc. v. 
 
enced by personal preferences, as he has charged colleagues with succumbing to this 
temptation on numerous occasions.  See, e.g., Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516, 2532 
(2006) (Scalia, J., concurring); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 585–86 (1996) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 236 See, e.g., Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Through the Lens of Diversity: The Fight for Judicial Elec-
tions After Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 55, 56–57 
(2004); Sarah Frisque, Note, Preventing Mudslinging in Chambers: Alternatives After the 
innesota v. White, 26 HAMLINE 
. 
olitical arena, the terms “conservative” and “liberal” cannot be 
e lar usage, including al-
t Century: Tracing the 
r
Demise of the Announce Clause in Republican Party of M
L REV. 415, 416–17, 462 (2003). 
 237 See White, 536 U.S. at 788–92 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 238 536 U.S. at 782 (majority opinion). 
 239 See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text. 
 240 Even in the p
d fined with comprehensive precision.  However, their popu
lied polarities like “red state” and “blue state,” reflects a widespread perception that 
at least some salient social and political issues can be helpfully understood as eliciting 
divisions between these two camps.  The examples employed in this section, it is felt, 
are associated with identifiable conservative and liberal attitudes. 
 241 See infra notes 261–87 and accompanying text. 
 242 See, e.g., Roger J. Miner, Judicial Ethics in the Twenty-Firs
T ends, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1107, 1112 (2004); White, supra note 19, at 623. 
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rs to its questionnaires from judicial candi-
date
and alive and . . . the right of human beings should be respected at 
every stage of their biological development,”247 and “the Kentucky 
Constitution does not require that same-sex couples be permitted to 
 
Bader,243 for example, the petitioner organization alleged that the 
state’s commit and pledges or promises clauses interfered with its 
ability to obtain answe
s.  The Alliance, which promotes socially conservative beliefs,244 
asked candidates to register their agreement or disagreement with 
such propositions as “the North Dakota Constitution does not recog-
nize a right to homosexual sexual relationships,” “the North Dakota 
Constitution does not recognize a right to abortion,” and the Su-
preme Court’s ruling that school-sponsored prayer at school athletic 
events violates the Establishment Clause245 “was incorrectly decided . . 
. .”246  Other suits by groups with missions like the Alliance’s have also 
been brought for the purpose of learning candidates’ views on social 
and religious issues.  Again, the nature of the beliefs that candidates 
were asked to affirm or dispute reflected distinctly conservative posi-
tions on these issues: e.g., “[t]he unborn child is biologically human 
enter into civil unions that encompass those state rights that attach to 
legal marriage.”   While surveys of judicial candidates are not the 
exclusive province of the right,  recent campaigns have continued to 
indicate disproportionate activity from this part of the ideological 
spectrum.
248
249
250
 
 243 361 F. Supp. 2d 1021 (D.N.D. 2005). 
 244 See Dale Wetzel, Group Wants Marriage Defined in Constitution, BISMARCK TRIBUNE, 
May 26, 2004, at 1. 
 245 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
 246 N.D. Family Alliance, Inc. v. Bader, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1028 (D. N.D. 2005). 
 247 Kan. Judicial Watch v. Stout, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 1217; Judge: Wisconsin Judicial 
Ethics Rules Will Hold During Campaign, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 2007, available at 
http://www.winonadailynews.com/articles/2007/02/14/wi/06winews0214.txt (dis-
cussing anti-abortion group’s challenge of state’s prohibition on promises in order to 
learn candidates’ positions on abortion before election). 
 248   Family Trust Found. of Ky. v. Wolnitzek, 345 F. Supp. 2d 672, 679 (E.D. Ky. 
visited Dec. 31, 2007).
Announces the Florida Judicial Accountability Project (July 24, 2006), avail-
2004).  One conservative organization, the Christian Coalition of Georgia, has gen-
erally framed the propositions on which candidates are asked to register their views 
in terms of positions opposed by the Coalition: “Secondary school-based clinics 
should dispense birth control devices without requiring prior parental notification 
and consent.”  Alyson M. Palmer, Christian Group’s Judicial Survey Tackles Abortion, 
Taxes, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REPORT, July 28, 2006, available at http://www.law. 
com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1153991136019 (last  
 249 See, e.g., Moerke, supra note 96, at 324 (describing questionnaire distributed by 
Austin Gay/Lesbian Political Caucus). 
 250 See, e.g., Press Release, Florida Family Policy Council, Florida Family Policy 
Council 
STERN_FINAL 1/16/2008  5:59:23 PM 
2008] THE LOOMING COLLAPSE 101 
 
down
 
Another area in which loosened speech restraints serve conser-
vative aims is criminal prosecution.  While no political or judicial 
candidate would campaign on a platform of leniency toward crimi-
nals,251 a relatively tough “law and order” stance toward suspected and 
convicted criminals has long been associated with conservative phi-
losophy.252  In some instances, a candidate’s attempt to spell out this 
philosophy has provoked charges of exceeding limits on campaign 
expression.  The White litigation itself was launched by a former can-
didate for the Minnesota Supreme Court who accused that court of 
untoward solicitude toward criminals.253  Nor was this an isolated in-
stance; allegedly overzealous assurances that a candidate will crack
 on criminals appear to be the chief source of disciplinary ac-
tions under campaign speech codes.254  In one of the few reported 
decisions since White to sustain sanctions,255 the Florida Supreme 
Court found a violation of state canons in a candidate’s “cloaking her 
entire candidacy in the umbrella of law enforcement and portraying 
 
able at http://www.christiannewswire.com/images/1153633747.pdf (announcing 
Florida Family Policy Council’s 2006 Judicial Candidate Questionnaire for obtaining 
the “personal views of candidates on specific issues such as school vouchers, parental 
rights, abortion rights, assisted suicide, same sex marriage and criminal law”); Alyson 
M. Palmer, Christian Group’s Judicial Survey Tackles Abortion, Taxes, FULTON COUNTY 
DAILY REPORT, Jun. 28, 2006, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id= 
1153991136019 (questionnaire by Christian Coalition of Georgia's for judicial candi-
dates asking agreement with, inter alia, propositions that  “The Georgia Constitution 
does not recognize a right to abortion” and that “Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965) and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) . . . are examples of judicial activism”). 
venile Court-Part II: Race and the 
me, 84 MINN. L. REV. 327, 367 (1999); Ahmed A. White, Vic-
536 U.S. at 771. 
 251 See Anthony Champagne, Television Ads in Judicial Campaigns, 35 IND. L. REV. 
669, 672 n.21 (2002) (finding that being “tough on crime” was a campaign theme in 
each of the four states studied); Failinger, supra note 21, at 462–63 (citing examples 
of campaign advertisements portraying advertiser as tough on crime); Hans A Linde, 
Elective Judges: Some Comparative Comments, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1995, 2000 (1988) (assert-
ing that “[e]very judge’s campaign slogan . . . is some variation of ‘tough on  
crime’” ); see generally Weiss, supra note 191. 
 252 See Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Ju
“Crack Down” on Youth Cri
tims’ Rights, Rule of Law, and the Threat to Liberal Jurisprudence, 87 KY. L.J. 357, 390 
(1999). 
 253 See White, 
 254 In re Haan, 676 N.E.2d 740, 741 (Ind. 1997) (finding violation of commit 
clause where campaign materials stated that candidate would “stop suspending sen-
tences” and “stop putting criminals on probation”); In re Burick, 705 N.E.2d 422, 
425, 427 (Ohio 1999) (ruling that pledge or promise and commit clauses were vio-
lated by, inter alia, advertisements stating that “Elizabeth Burick will be a tough Judge 
that supports the death penalty and isn’t afraid to use it”); In re Kaiser, 759 P.2d 392, 
396 (Wash. 1988) (campaign declarations that candidate would be tough on drunk 
driving held to violate pledges or promises clause). 
 255 See supra Part II.C. 
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herself as a future pro-prosecution/pro-law enforcement judge while 
characterizing her opponent as dismissing criminals and not holding 
them accountable.”256  (Notably, she had accused her opponent of 
“very definitely” being “a Liberal.”257)  Should th
e Court invalidate common versions of the pledges or promises 
and commit clauses, however, candidates will presumably be allowed 
to elaborate on their philosophy of law enforcement in this manner. 
Finally, allowing judicial candidates to conduct themselves in the 
manner of traditional politicians could enhance the impact of busi-
ness interests on judicial elections.  For at least the past decade, vari-
ous groups have expended considerable sums to promote candidates 
likely to rule favorably on issues affecting business.258  The Chamber 
of Commerce has been particularly active in seeking to prevent the 
election and especially reelection of judges thought excessively sym-
pathetic to consumers and unions.259  Of course, restrictions on the 
speech of candidates have not prevented such groups from already 
exerting a substantial impact on judicial elections.  Unshackling can-
didates from campaign restraints, however, would enable them to ap-
peal more openly to supp
e, the lifting of campaign speech limitations would indirectly 
magnify the role of wealth in elections, much as the abolition of limi-
tations on campaign finance would do so directly.  Conservatives on 
the Court have been outspoken in advocating the latter;260 it was not 
surprising in White to see them favor the former. 
 
 256 In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77, 82, 88–89 (Fla. 2003) (upholding judicial panel’s 
T. 
y, 70 JUDICATURE 348, 350 (1987) (noting substan-
t. 16, 2004, at A4. 
t has been widely speculated that Justice O’Connor’s re-
finding). 
 257 Id. at 82. 
  John D. Echeverria, Changing the Rules by Changing the Players: The Environmental 
Issue in State Judicial Elections, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 217, 225–37 (2001); Clive S. Tho-
mas et al., Interest Groups and State Court Elections, 87 JUDICATURE 135 (2003).  Of 
course, instances of this phenomenon can be traced further back.  See, e.g., 
258
John 
Wold & John H. Culver, The Defeat of the California Justices: The Campaign, the Electorate, 
and the Issue of Judicial Accountabilit
tial contributions by oil and gas interests, agribusiness, auto dealers, and real estate 
interests to the 1978 campaign to oust Rose Bird from California Supreme Court). 
 259 See Carter, Boosting, supra note 92, at 29; John R. Wilke, Chamber of Commerce 
Targets State Races, WALL ST. J., Sep
 260 See supra note 71.  I
placement by Justice Alito calls into jeopardy the Court’s decision to sustain the 
McCain-Feingold federal campaign law in McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).  See, 
e.g., Robert Barnes & Matthew Mosk, High Court to Revisit Campaign Finance Law: New 
Lineup on Bench Will Consider Ad Limits, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2007, at A1; Linda 
Greenhouse, Justices Revisit Campaign Finance Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2007, at A9. 
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 issue will not 
nece
Even with these caveats, however, an attorney whose client had a 
 
Nevertheless, in anticipating the fate of judicial campaign codes, 
it is fair to question whether the frequent alignment of untrammeled 
campaign speech with conservative values will influence the Court’s 
rulings on restrictions.  After all, ascertaining with certainty the moti-
vation of even a single Justice is an impossible task, and Justices obvi-
ously conceive of themselves as detached from partisan influences.  
Whatever the motivation, a Justice’s approach to an
ssarily remain static.  Moreover, which views qualify as conserva-
tive positions in law and politics, and the link between the two, is sub-
ject to debate.  Finally, two members of the White majority have been 
replaced by Justices who have not weighed in on judicial campaign 
restraints,261 while more shifts in personnel may occur before the 
Court confronts the issue again.  Thus, a forecast of doctrinal devel-
opments in this area cannot rest primarily on suspected preferences 
by members of the Court. 
stake in the strictness or leniency of campaign speech restraints 
would not ignore the potential impact of current Justices’ personal 
predilections in this area.262  This is by no means a taboo subject.  At 
least since the Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore,263 observers have often 
ventured opinions on the role of Justices’ political and policy prefer-
ences in their resolution of constitutional issues.264  One need not 
harbor a wholly cynical or deterministic outlook to discern certain 
 
 261 Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito have taken the places of Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor. 
 262 Cf. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 321 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (in-
ferring that lawyer’s “candid reply” to inquiry by defendant in capital case would note 
jority was motivated by partisan affinity in effectively resolving the 
that “there was a significant chance that race would play a prominent role in deter-
mining” defendant’s sentence). 
 263 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 264 Much of the outpouring of commentary on the decision speculated on 
whether the ma
disputed presidential contest between George W. Bush and Al Gore in favor of then-
Governor Bush.  The accusatory nature of much of this literature is captured in the 
titles of books on the case, e.g., VINCENT BUGLIOSI, THE BETRAYAL OF AMERICA: HOW 
THE SUPREME COURT UNDERMINED THE CONSITUTION AND CHOSE OUR PRESIDENT 
(2001); ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME INJUSTICE: HOW THE HIGH COURT HIJACKED 
ELECTION 2000 (2001), and articles in the press, e.g., Renata Adler, Irreparable Harm: 
The Unexpected Origins of the Supreme Court’s Worst Decision, THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 30, 
2001; Hugo Young, Comment and Analysis: Democracy was Poisoned to Give Bush the Presi-
dency, THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 14, 2000, at 24.  Analysis of the possible interplay of law 
and politics in the case, however, also appeared in serious legal journals.  See, e.g., 
Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110 YALE L.J. 
1407 (2001); Pamela S. Karlan, Unduly Partial: The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth 
Amendment in Bush v. Gore, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 587, 600–01 (2001). 
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tendencies when conservative goals are implicated, or to conclude 
that attitudes toward judicial campaign speech are likely to follow 
that pattern.  Nor should this inquiry be thwarted by complications in 
defining conservatism; whatever the simplification involved, journal-
ists and legal commentators alike routinely distinguish “conservative” 
Justices from those deemed “liberal” or “moderate.”265
Two members of the Court universally described as conservative 
are Justices Scalia and Thomas.  Professor Chemerinsky, for example, 
specifically pointed to them when he stated that conservative Justices 
have supplanted their liberal colleagues as premier defenders of First 
Amendment freedoms.266  In fact, however, Justices Scalia and Tho-
mas have frequently sided with the state in resisting claims of expres-
sive and associational rights supported by “liberal” colleagues like Jus-
tices Stevens and Souter.267  Rather than generally advocate expansive 
protection, they have selectively supported First Amendment claims 
in cases where the Court has been divided.  Among the objects of 
their solicitude have been anti-abortion protesters;268 an organization 
seeking to exclude an “avowed homosexual” from membership;269 a 
 
 265 See, e.g., Mark Graber, Does it Really Matter? Conservative Courts in a Conservative 
Era, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 675 (2006); Robert Hume, The Use of Rhetorical Sources by t e h
U.S. Supreme Court, 40 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 817, 826–29; Michiko Kakutani, Court No 
ment, 38 TRIAL 78 
eech Cases, 1994–2000, 
 voting records that it would be 
ents made pursuant to their 
braries to use Internet filters as condition 
. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 
Longer Divided: Conservatives in Triumph, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2007, at E1; David 
Kirkpatrick, In Alito, G.O.P. Reaps Harvest Planted in ‘82, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2006, at 
A1. 
 266 Erwin Chemerinsky, Judicial Elections and the First Amend
(2002); see also Eugene Volokh, How the Justices Voted in Free Sp
48 UCLA L. REV. 1191, 1198 (2001) (inferring from
wrong to “assume that the Left generally sides with speakers and the Right with the 
government”). 
 267 See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (denying First Amendment 
protection to public employees disciplined for statem
official duties); United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (sustaining 
facial validity of statute requiring public li
for receipt of federal subsidies); Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (recogniz-
ing First Amendment protection of media’s disclosure of phone conversation that 
had been illegally taped by a third party); Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 
533 (2001) (holding that law prohibiting Legal Services Corporation from funding 
legal representation involving efforts to amend or challenge welfare law violated First 
Amendment); Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998) (reject-
ing independent political candidate’s challenge to exclusion from debate sponsored 
by state-owned television broadcaster); Timmons v
U.S. 351 (1997) (finding that laws forbidding candidates to appear on ballot of more 
than one political party do not violate associational rights). 
 268 See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 741–65 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W.N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 385–95 (1997) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 269 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653–61 (2000). 
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sts automatically enlist the sympathy of Justices Scalia and 
Tho
 
 
young man convicted of violating an ordinance banning fighting 
words that insult or provoke violence “on the basis of race, color, 
creed, religion or gender”;270 producers assessed the cost of generic 
advertising of California fruits;271 and opponents of limitations on po-
litical campaign contributions.272  Of course, it would be wrong to as-
sume that First Amendment claimants who champion conservative 
social values, challenge “politically correct” laws, or represent mon-
eyed intere
mas—much less that their votes in these cases signal approval of 
the claimant’s viewpoint.273  However, it would also be wrong to as-
cribe their votes to general enthusiasm for First Amendment rights, 
or to reject the possibility that substantive preferences have colored 
their approach to constitutional issues.  In the realm of takings doc-
trine, their attachment to property rights has been a more reliable 
index of behavior274 than their ostensible commitment to federal-
ism.275  Similarly, states may regard judicial campaign regulations as 
integral to judicial independence under their separation of powers,276 
but in White Justices Scalia and Thomas were willing to overturn Min-
nesota’s restriction.  In this sense, White might be considered an illus-
tration of what Richard Fallon described as the tendency of the con-
servative majority’s substantive conservatism to trump its pro-
 270 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
. WASH. L. REV. 888, 897 n.76 (2006). 
 for 
es Scalia and Thomas as members of the “Federalist Five”).
epublican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 773 (8th Cir. 2005) (Gib-
 271 Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 504–06 (1997) (Tho-
mas, J., joined by Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 272 See e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 247–64 (2003) (opinion of Scalia, J.); 
Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000). 
 273 See, e.g., R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 396 (condemning petitioner’s act of burning cross 
in black family’s lawn as “reprehensible”). 
 274 See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 494–505 (2005) (O’Connor, 
J., joined by Scalia and Thomas, J.J., dissenting) (dissenting from holding that city 
could exercise eminent domain to acquire properties to transfer to corporation for 
development); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in the judgment) (joining Court’s holding invalidating 
requirement that property owner grant easement as condition for receiving building 
permit); see also Roderick Hills, Jr., The Individual Right to Federalism in the Rehnquist 
Court, 74 GEO
 275 See Thomas Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary 
Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569, 575 (2003); Betsy McCaughey Ross, New Support
States Rights: The Conflict Between Federalism and Equal Protection is the Defining Issue of 
Important Cases Now Before the Supreme Court, AM. OUTLOOK, Winter 2000, at 44–45 (list-
ing Justic
 276 See R
son, J., dissenting) (arguing that “[e]ven the narrowest notion of federalism” recog-
nizes that the state has a compelling interest in separation of powers sufficient to jus-
tify partisan activities and solicitation clauses). 
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see how their appointees’ judi-
cial philosophies will unfold,282 there is no reason to think that the 
e disappointment to 
 
federalism values.277  Given the disregard for the state’s choice by Jus-
tices Scalia and Thomas, and the potential beneficiaries of lifting 
other restraints, a realist would expect similar treatment of these  
restraints. 
A realist would also expect them to be joined by Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justice Alito in striking down campaign speech limita-
tions.  In light of these two Justices’ brief tenure on the Court, a for-
malist might regard the extrapolation of their votes as crudely specu-
lative.  It is hardly far-fetched, however, to assume that these four 
ces would be aligned in instances where a conservative position 
has been established.  The president who appointed Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justice Alito had announced as a candidate that he 
would place on the Court Justices in the mold of Justices Scalia and 
Thomas.278  Scholarly commentators have openly cited the selection 
of these “two strongly conservative judges”279as an example of “parti-
san entrenchment,”280 i.e., appointing ideologically sympathetic Jus-
tices with a view toward “securing judicial allies who will work with 
and bolster one’s existing political coalition.”281  While it has often 
been said that presidents cannot fore
two most recently appointed Justices will prove th
 
 277 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism 
Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 434, 469 (2002).  For his conception of substantive 
conservativism, Fallon adopts the classification method employed by Jeffrey Segal 
and Harold Spaeth in a number of studies.  Id. at 447 & nn.92–97.  Under this 
scheme, conservative judicial positions include disfavoring the criminally accused 
and antagonism toward unions, injured plaintiffs, and government regulatory au-
the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices Revisited, 57 J. POL. 812, 815 & n.4 
(quoting Alexander 
thority over businesses.  Id. (citing Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Val-
ues and 
(1989)); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism as the 
United States Enters the 21st Century, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2004, at 53, 59 
(arguing that Scalia and Thomas vote according to value choices and end-result con-
servatism). 
 278 Neil A. Lewis, The 2000 Campaign: The Judiciary; Presidential Candidates Differ 
Sharply on Judges They Would Appoint to Top Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2000, at 128. 
 279 Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change: From 
Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 505 
(2006). 
 280 Id. 
 281 Id. at 491; see also JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE 
STORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 185–211, 
285–315 (2007) (providing accounts of the selections of Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justice Alito). 
  See, e.g., Judgment on a Justice, TIME, May 23, 1969, at 23–24 282
Bickel).
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lleagues on a consid-
erab
tion.  Minnesota’s version of the announce clause, for example, was 
the “broadest and most unreasonable” and had “long been aban-
 
President Bush that Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan are 
said to have been to President Eisenhower.283  Quite the opposite ap-
pears to be the case.  As has been widely observed, Chief Justice Rob-
erts and Justice Alito have thus far routinely voted with Justices Scalia 
and Thomas in cases where the Court is perceived to have split into 
conservative and liberal camps.284
As for Justice Kennedy, his anticipated opposition to additional 
campaign speech restrictions is both less explicable as conservative 
bias and more assured.  Overall, Justice Kennedy has exhibited 
greater receptivity to First Amendment claims than Justices Scalia and 
Thomas, having parted company from these co
le number of occasions.285  It was no surprise, then, that in White 
Kennedy broadly objected to restraints on campaign speech.286  As 
Justice Stevens recognized in dissent, Justice Kennedy’s position 
would logically preclude a pledges or promises clause like Minne-
sota’s287—and doubtless most others. 
E. White and Other Camouflaged Watersheds 
The idea that White presages sweeping invalidation of judicial 
campaign speech restraints has ample parallels in other areas.  Sub-
ject to the fact-driven nature of adjudication and other constraints on 
crafting opinions, the Court has often launched major doctrinal in-
novation in limited terms.  These decisions have thus furnished critics 
a basis for resisting the wider implications of the holding.  This is es-
pecially true in cases that offer relatively narrow grounds for resolu-
 
  See Stephen J. Wermeil, The Nomination of Justice Brennan: Eisenhower’s Mistake? A 
Look at the Historical Record, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 515, 534–36 (1995). 
 
283
284 See Thomas Goldstein, End of Term Statistics and Analysis, PREVIEW U.S. SUP. CT. 
CASES, July 31, 2006, at 437–39; The Supreme Court—The Statistics, 120 HARV. L. REV. 
372, 374–76 (2006). 
285  Compare Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 528–35 (2001) (recognizing First 
Amendment protection of media’s disclosure of phone conversation that had been 
illegally taped by a third party), with id. at 541–56 (Rehnquist, J., joined by Scalia and 
Thomas, JJ., dissenting); compare Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 546–
49 (2001) (holding that law prohibiting Legal Services Corporation from funding 
legal representation involving efforts to amend or challenge welfare law violates First 
Amendment), with id. at 549–63 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting); compare 
Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 635 (1995) (upholding ban on personal 
injury lawyers’ sending targeted direct-mail solicitations within thirty days of acci-
dent), with id. at 635–45 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 286 See 536 U.S. at 793 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 287 Id. at 802 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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doned by the ABA.”288  The Court therefore did not have to pro-
nounce on the wider invalidity of campaign speech restrictions in or-
der to strike down this especially vulnerable provision.  Until future 
cases provide vehicles for taking this step, observers and bar associa-
tions can indulge in the possibility of White’s modest reach.  It ap-
pears, however, that they will find themselves in the position of 
predecessors who clung to similarly vain hopes. 
A classic example of this phenomenon was the reaction by some 
observers to the Court’s decision in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp.289  In retrospect, the holding marked the repudiation of con-
strictive interpretations of the Commerce Clause290 and the advent of 
enormous expansion of federal regulatory power.291  At the time, 
however, the decision was not generally understood as launching an 
era of near-plenary congressional authority under the Commer
se.  As in White, the dispute offered circumstances that enabled 
the Court to resolve the case without committing itself to a more am-
bitious doctrine.  Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation challenged 
Congress’s ability to prohibit the dismissal of employees who attempt 
to organize a union.  In sustaining the relevant provision of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, the Court emphasized Congress’s finding 
that interference with collective bargaining led to obstruction of com-
merce,292 the sprawling magnitude of Jones & Laughlin’s opera-
tions,293 and the “immediate and catastrophic” effect that disruption 
 
 288 Baran, supra note 34, at 12. 
 289 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
 290 See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 303–04 (1936) (excluding 
conditions of employment of miners from Commerce Clause power); A.L.A. 
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542–52 (1935) (holding that 
ger subject to Commerce Clause 
o
nbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 301–02 (1964) (sustaining en-
te against racial discrimination by local restaurant on 
irements for employees engaged in the production of goods for 
 Robert Stern, 
development did not negate the existence of the 
e rence begun by Jones & Laughlin. 
ghlin, 301 U.S. at 22 n.1, 31–32. 
. 
poultry shipped in interstate commerce is no lon
g local slaughterhouse). p wer after reachin
291 atze  See, e.g., K
forcement of civil rights statu
ground that aggregate instances of discrimination have significant effect on inter-
state commerce); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127–28 (1942); United States v. 
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 117–24 (1941) (upholding imposition of minimum wage and 
maximum hour requ
interstate commerce).  For overviews of this development, see RONALD ROTUNDA & 
JOHN NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 446–56 (3d ed. 1999);
The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 59 HARV. L. REV. 645, 645-93, 893–947 
(1946).  The Court ultimately began to impose limits on the reach of the Commerce 
Clause power, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), but this 
d cades-long period of defe
 292 Jones & Lau
 293 Id. at 25–27
STERN_FINAL 1/16/2008  5:59:23 PM 
2008] THE LOOMING COLLAPSE 109 
hout recognizing that 
it he
s solely on the basis 
of ra
 
of the company’s activities would have on interstate commerce.294  
The opinion did not disavow recent decisions invalidating compara-
bly ambitious New Deal legislation,295 much less indicate that the 
power upheld would later encompass regulation of activities as re-
mote from interstate commerce as service at a small local restaurant296 
and loan-sharking.297  Understandably, many commentators appreci-
ated the practical impact of Jones & Laughlin wit
ralded the collapse of meaningful limitations on Congress’s 
Commerce Clause power.298  Still, a realistic appraisal of the likely 
course of the doctrine—including the effect of expected appoint-
ments by President Roosevelt—would have produced a more pre-
scient grasp of the decision’s pivotal significance. 
A second development that may be instructive for the fate of 
limitations on judicial campaigning is the dismantling of officially 
sponsored racial segregation in the wake of Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion.299  Brown is a landmark decision, but the ultimate general fall of 
state-mandated discrimination has tended to obscure the specific 
scope of Brown’s holding.  On its face, the decision addressed only 
whether “segregation of children in public school
ce” violates the Equal Protection Clause.300  Holding that it does, 
the Court found that forced separation generated in black school-
children “a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community 
that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be 
undone.”301  This conclusion in turn rested largely on psychological 
and other studies cited by the Court.302  Neither the decision nor the 
terms in which it was explained necessitated the elimination of the 
broader regime of segregation.  Yet, the Court soon issued a series of 
per curiam decisions finding violations of equality in the separation 
 
 294 Id. at 41. 
 295 See id. at 29–30, 40–41. 
ommodation under Title II of the Civil 
ited States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (upholding federal criminal statute 
11. 
 296 Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 298–305 (1964) (upholding ban on ra-
cial discrimination in places of public acc
Rights Act of 1964). 
 297 Perez v. Un
prohibiting individual instances of “extortionate credit transactions”). 
 298 See, e.g., Haskell Donoho, Jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board—The 
Developing Concept of Interstate Commerce, 6 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 436, 450 (1937); Calvert 
Magruder, A Half Century of Legal Influence upon the Development of Collective Bargaining, 
50 HARV. L. REV. 1071, 1095 (1937). 
 299 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 300 Id. at 493. 
 301 Id. at 494. 
 302 See id. at 494 n.
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 disavowals.  The advance in rights 
of reproductive and sexual autonomy that began in Griswold v. Con-
necticut308 d struck 
dow
tees,  the Court’s brief opinion repeatedly emphasized the law’s 
specific invasion of the relation of “married persons.”311  Still, a few years 
 
of parks,303 golf courses,304 and other public facilities.305  Only years 
later, in the course of invalidating a law barring white persons from 
marrying outside their race, did the Court promulgate a formal prin-
ciple of strict scrutiny for racial classifications.306
While there is obviously no moral equivalence between those 
who urge restrictions on what judicial candidates may say and those 
who defended the vestiges of Jim Crow, these two sets of legal posi-
tions may well prove similarly untenable.  The egregious inequality of 
dual school systems made them especially susceptible to legal chal-
lenge307 and thus a potent starting point for eradicating the regime of 
official racism.  Similarly, Minnesota’s dubious announce clause pro-
vided an attractive beginning for a project of eliminating judicial 
campaign speech restraints.  Of course it remains to be seen whether 
the Roberts Court will object to campaign speech limits as thoroughly 
as the Warren Court opposed categorizing citizens by race.  Again, 
however, there is little reason to think otherwise. 
Finally, one further example illustrates in particular why propo-
nents of campaign speech restrictions should take little comfort from 
the White Court’s qualifications and
 was by no means charted at the outset.  Griswol
n Connecticut’s ban on the use of contraceptive devices as a vio-
lation of the right of privacy emanating from specific guarantees in 
the Bill of Rights.309  While referring to this right as comprising vague 
and potentially expansive “penumbras” formed by these guaran-
310
 
 303 New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass’n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (per 
curiam), aff’g 252 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1958). 
 304 Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam), rev’g 223 F.2d 93 
(5th Cir. 1955). 
 305 Mayor & City Council v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiam), aff’g 220 
F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955) (public facilities included swimming pools, inter alia); see 
Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 
22–23 (1959) (suggesting that the Court failed to articulate principled basis for ex-
 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). 
965). 
arriage rela-
tending Brown’s ruling to such facilities). 
 306 Loving v. Virginia, 388
 307 See generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1975). 
 308 381 U.S. 479 (1
 309 Id. at 484–86. 
 310 Id. at 484. 
 311 Id. at 480.  The Court noted that the ban “operate[d] directly on an intimate 
relation of husband and wife.”  Id. at 482.  The Court also stated that the law pursued 
its goals “by means having a maximum destructive impact” upon the m
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e v. Wade313 added a woman’s de-
cision to terminate her pregnancy to the roster of privacy rights—a 
in the Court’s Griswold opinion.314  Nor did the 
Grisw
e general fate awaiting limitations on judicial campaign 
spee
 
later the Court invalidated a law barring unmarried persons from ac-
cess to contraception on the ground that the right of privacy is “the 
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwar-
ranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affect-
ing a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”312  The 
next term, the Court’s decision in Ro
right not intimated 
old Court contemplate the constitutional right to engage in ho-
mosexual conduct that was later recognized in Lawrence v. Texas;315 at 
least six of the participating Justices expressly or implicitly denied 
that the holding interfered with the state’s ability to regulate this ac-
tivity.316  Like White, Griswold thus involved a ready target—even the 
dissenters agreed that Connecticut had enacted “an uncommonly 
silly law”317—whose toppling supplied a platform for inroads on other 
restrictions.  The extension of White to invalidate most restraints on 
judicial campaign speech appears at least as logical as the outgrowth 
of autonomy rights from Griswold. 
III. THE DISPOSITION OF INDIVIDUAL RESTRICTIONS 
Th
ch appears to be cast.  The Court, however, has given no indica-
tion of announcing a principle of categorical invalidity.  Instead, in-
dividual restrictions are more likely to arise in case-by-case litigation.  
Key aspects of the Court’s reasoning in White,318 as well as successful 
 
tionship, and noted that the prospect of police searching marital bedrooms for signs 
of violation was “repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage rela-
tionship,” and describing that relationship as “an association for as noble a purpose 
as any involved in our prior decisions.  Id. at 485–86.  Justice Goldberg, concurring, 
agreed that the law intruded upon “the right of marital privacy,” see id. at 486, and 
Justice White, concurring in the judgment, stated that the case involved the right “to 
be free of regulation of the intimacies of the marriage relationship.”  Id. at 503. 
 312 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 
 Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE 
ing in judgment) (reaffirming his dissent in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 
wart, J., dissenting). 
 313 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 314 See John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on
L.J. 920, 929 (1973). 
 315 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 316 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 498–99 (Goldberg, J., concurring); id. at 500 (Harlan, 
J., concurr
552 (1961), which acknowledged the state’s power to forbid homosexuality); id. at 
508–10 (Black, J., dissenting) (rejecting constitutional right of privacy). 
 317 Id. at 527 (Ste
 318 See supra Part II.B.2. 
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l campaigning by judicial candi-
date
andidacies; arguably, therefore, the commit clause 
 
challenges that have been mounted since that decision,319 suggest 
grounds for striking down these restraints.  The core provisions of ef-
forts to impede full-blown politica
s—the commit clause and pledges or promises clause—are espe-
cially susceptible to such rationales. 
A. Commit Clause 
States that retain a discrete commit clause typically prohibit 
“statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate with re-
spect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come before 
the court.”320  The restriction’s fundamental rationale is that making 
commitments on legal issues “tends to undermine the fundamental 
fairness and impartiality of the legal system.”321  While it may be 
“unlikely that the [White opinion] was intended to resolve the consti-
tutionality of the Commit Clause,”322 the Court’s logic inescapably 
dooms that provision.  In crucial respects, the commit clause is indis-
tinguishable from Minnesota’s announce clause.  Moreover, a flaw 
that the White Court could have found but did not address—the an-
nounce clause’s vagueness—can also be ascribed to the commit 
clause. 
Attempts to defend the commit clause would probably empha-
size the restriction’s sharper focus and fit compared to the announce 
clause.  Unlike the announcement of views, which connotes a range 
of inclinations on legal issues, the notion of commitment suggests 
statements of a firm and binding nature.  More than announcements, 
commitments can be construed as candidates’ “effectively telling the 
electorate: ‘Vote for me because I believe X, and I will judge cases ac-
cordingly.’”323  A commitment to rule in a certain manner may thus 
be said to negate openmindedness by predetermining the judge’s po-
sition in a case irrespective of the merits.  By the same token, com-
mitments to act in a particular way as judge are more distinctly asso-
ciated with active c
 
  See supra Part II.C. 
 320 See, e.g., ARK. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (2003); ME. 
OD
 Removal Comm’n, 776 F. Supp. 309, 315 (W.D. 
, at 215; see also GASS, supra note 119, at 14 (arguing that 
d as settling the question of the Commit Clause’s 
319
C E OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(B)(2) (2007). 
  Ackerson v. Ky. Judicial Ret. &321
Ky. 1991).
 322 Briffault, supra note 94
White “cannot reasonably be rea
constitutionality”). 
 323 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 800 (2002) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting). 
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utside the formal period of 
cand
mitment” to a position by someone who is not speaking in the capac-
ity of a candidate. 
 
does not suffer from the underinclusiveness that limited the an-
nounce clause’s ban to campaigns. 
Notwithstanding the surface plausibility of this line of reasoning, 
it will almost certainly fail in the face of White’s overwhelming pre-
sumption against speech restrictions.  Even assuming that judicial 
openmindedness is deemed a compelling interest, the Court’s insis-
tence on narrowly tailored measures leaves the commit clause subject 
to several attacks.  First, the breadth of issues comprehended by the 
clause is the same as that which the Court viewed skeptically in White. 
According to the Court, confining the reach of the announce clause 
to issues likely to come before a court “is not much of a limitation at 
all;” after all, “‘[t]here is almost no legal or political issue that is 
unlikely to come before a judge of an American court.’” 324  In addi-
tion, even a supporter of the commit clause has expressed concern 
that the inclusion of statements that “appear to commit” a candidate 
could render the commit clause problematically expansive.325  If that 
pitfall is somehow avoided, it is still unlikely that the commit clause’s 
nexus with campaigns will extricate it from the underinclusive-
ness/overbreadth snare that White’s logic appears to set.326  “Com-
mitment” to a position may convey greater intensity than “an-
nouncement,” but either can be issued o
idacy.  Non-campaign forums identified by the Court as vehicles 
for announcements—books, speeches, or a judge’s prior 
opinions327—also lend themselves to expressions of commitment.328  
Again, however, any cure for this underinclusiveness would inevitably 
offend the First Amendment.  It would be impossible to craft a ban 
on commitments in these various forms without forbidding protected 
speech.  In particular, the problem of retroactivity329 is aggravated in 
the case of commitments, for it is not clear what constitutes “com-
In addition, the challenge of defining commitments outside of 
campaigns is only one part of a multifaceted problem of vagueness.  
 
 324 Id. at 772 (majority opinion) (quoting Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Bd., 
997 F. 2d 224, 229 (7th Cir. 1993)). 
 325 See Briffault, supra note 94, at 217. 
 326 See supra Part II.B.3.d. 
36 U.S. at 779.  327 See White, 5
 328 See Juetten, supra note 87, at 697–98 (arguing that commit clause is similar to 
the invalid announce clause in that “it only applies to speech prohibition at certain 
times and in certain forms”). 
 329 See supra notes 210–11 and accompanying text. 
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 guidance as to prohibited 
spee
ife”—undoubtedly another phrase “widely and indiscrimi-
nate
 
Unless viewed formalistically, the very question of when a candidacy 
begins is potentially contentious, especially for sitting judges.330  Even 
in the context of unambiguous campaigning, moreover, the commit 
clause fails to give candidates definite
ch.  Somewhat paradoxically, commitments seemingly comprise 
a smaller category than announcements331 but appear equally difficult 
to identify.  Indeed, the blurry line between permissible announce-
ments and forbidden commitments332 may elude candidates and en-
forcers alike.  In In re Shanley,333 for example, the New York State Judi-
cial Conduct Commission had determined that running as a “law and 
order candidate” breached the state’s commit clause because the 
candidate at least appeared to commit herself to favoring the prose-
cution in criminal cases.334  The New York Court of Appeals, however, 
found that the phrase did not amount to a violation since it is “widely 
and indiscriminately used in everyday parlance and election cam-
paigns.”335  In contrast, the Kentucky Supreme Court ruled that a 
candidate whose advertisements described him as a candidate who 
was “pro-l
ly used in everyday parlance and election campaigns”—
“appeared to commit him to a position not only on abortion matters, 
but also on other controversies.”336
The imprecision of banning statements that signify commitment 
is compounded when extended to statements that “appear to com-
mit” the candidate.  The principal purpose of this phrase presumably 
is to capture expression that effectively communicates commitment 
without using that term explicitly.  Even if the phrase is not inher-
ently overbroad, candidates can reasonably argue that it will often be 
impossible to predict whether certain language will ultimately be 
 
 330  71. 
  
than 
 EV
jectively understood to “appear to commit” a candidate). 
 333 774 N.E.2d 735 (N.Y. 2002) (per curiam). 
omm’n, 873 S.W.2d 200, 203 (Ky. 1994); 
e  on ground that “a judge could 
hilosophy without feeling bound to 
e issues if the evidence and the 
 See McCarty, supra note 88, at
331 See Moerke, supra note 96, at 299 (stating that “‘announce’ . . . means more 
‘commit’”). 
 332 See Alexa Green, Comment, Judicial Election Candidates’ Free Speech Rights After 
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White: Is the Problem Really Solved?, 44 SANTA CLARA 
L. R . 235, 265 (2003) (noting that many statements expressing a view can be sub-
 334 Id. at 736. 
 335 Id. at 737. 
 336 Deters v. Ky. Judicial Ret. & Removal C
se  Briffault, supra note 94, at 203 (criticizing decision
consider himself pro-life as a matter of personal p
reach a particular result in a case involving right-to-lif
law pointed in the other direction”). 
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found to project an appearance of commitment.  They will thus re-
frain from some protected speech because they feel compelled to 
“steer far wider of the unlawful zone.”337  In fact, perhaps mainly for 
this reason, a number of more recent versions of the commit clause 
have omitted this questionable phrase.338
Finally, even if the commit clause could be saved from vagueness 
and overbreadth through narrowing construction,339 the Court might 
still find this restriction intrinsically flawed.  As noted earlier,340 the 
availability of recusal in principle makes the suppression of campaign 
speech unnecessary.  Thus, on the one hand, a state might legiti-
mately regard some statements as improperly committing a candidate 
with respect to a certain issue: that “victims have a right to expect judges 
to protect them by denying bond to potentially dangerous offend-
ers[,]”341 or that the candidate “will be a tough Judge that supports 
the death penalty and isn’t afraid to use it.”342  The White Court’s so-
licitude for speech, on the other hand, suggests that the proper rem-
edy is petition by the bond applicant or capital defendant to seek re-
placement with a judge untainted by the bias revealed by campaign 
rhetoric. 
Admittedly, the remedy of recusal is less attractive in the case of 
judges n a state’s highest appellate court.  Since a nonparticipating 
justice generally cannot be replaced, withdrawal simply shrinks 
t rather than opening the door to a more dispassionate substi-
tute.  At the same time, however, White’s logic suggests that states lack 
a compelling interest in precluding involvement at this level by 
judges who have displayed commitment to a legal position.  In their 
nature, state supreme courts typically settle questions the resolution 
of which is open to reasonable competing interpretations.  In their 
case, therefore, concerns that demonstrations of commitment will in-
terfere with a justice’s ability to “follow the law” have less relevance. 
 
 337 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958). 
So. 2d 77, 81 (Fla. 2003). 
 338 See, e.g., CAL. CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 5B & Commentary (2006). 
 339 See Moerke, supra note 96, at 297–98. 
 340 See supra notes 188–98 and accompanying text. 
 341 In re Kinsey, 842 
 342 In re Burick, 705 N.E.2d 422, 425 (Ohio 1999). 
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346
lier,351 the greater threat to openmindedness that campaign promises 
 
B. Pledges or Promises Clause 
Much of whatever optimism remains about the viability of cam-
paign speech regulation centers on the pledges or promises clause.343  
A ban on “pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the 
faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office”344 is 
widely thought to address a heightened threat to judicial impartiality.  
More than an announcement of views or even expression of “com-
mitment” to a position, a “‘promise’ to rule in a particular way strikes 
at the heart of a litigant’s right to due process.”345  The pledges or 
promises clause thus embodies the belief that “when preconceptions 
harden into prejudgments, the judicial function itself is subverted.”   
The clause has also been defended as maintaining public confidence 
in the integrity of the judiciary; according to the Florida Supreme 
Court, a judicial candidate “should not be encouraged to believe that 
the candidate can be elected to office by promising to act in a parti-
san manner by favoring a discrete group or class of citizens.”347  
Moreover, the inherent scope of the pledges or promises clause ap-
pears to exempt it from charges of underinclusiveness; presumably 
only candidates can make meaningful pledges or promises.348  These 
arguments gain further support from judicially drawn distinctions be-
tween the announce clause and bans on campaign promises.  The 
Seventh Circuit, for example, while anticipating White in striking 
down Illinois’s announce clause, affirmed the state’s power to forbid 
“promises to rule in particular ways in particular cases or types of 
cases.”349  White itself took pains to distinguish statements prohibited 
by Minnesota’s invalid announce clause from “campaign promises.”350
Still, however appealing these considerations as policy, the 
pledges or promises clause is likely to run afoul of the Court’s fun-
damental aversion to campaign speech restrictions.  As discussed ear-
 
  See,
bright”). 
343  e.g., Moerke, supra note 96, at 310 (describing future of clause as “fairly 
 344 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A (3)(d)(ii) (1990) (amended 
2003). 
 345 Recent Changes, supra note 125, at 835 (transcript remark of Eric P. Schroeder). 
346  Briffault, supra note 94, at 211. 
347  In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d at 87. 
 348 See Young, supra note 96, at 457 (stating that pledges and promises “are 
unlikely to be made outside the context of a campaign”). 
 349 Buckley v. Ill. Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 230 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 350 536 U.S. at 780. 
 351 See supra notes 207–13 and accompanying text. 
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the most 
com
ent in any attempt to regulate this category of expression.  On the 
n statements that literally include one of 
 
may pose compared to nonpromissory statements does not immunize 
the pledges or promises clause from underinclusiveness.  Indeed, the 
Court’s description of campaign promises as “the least binding form 
of human commitment”352 suggests that their danger to openmind-
edness is only relative, and perhaps not grave at all.  At the same time, 
the standard version of the pledges or promises clause is also likely to 
founder on the overbreadth doctrine.  It is not difficult to conjure up 
legitimately promised conduct outside the bland and generic cate-
gory of “the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the 
office.”  A candidate could, for example, promise to “respect the First 
Amendment rights of protesters” or (perhaps more realistically) to 
“enforce our criminal laws as they are written.”353  Thus, almost a dec-
ade before White, Judge Posner denigrated the pledges or promises 
clause as dealing with the problem that it addressed “in 
prehensive way possible.”354  Likewise, a number of courts since 
White have struck down the pledges or promises clause on over-
breadth grounds.355
The 2007 ABA Model Code tacitly deals with overbreadth by 
specifying prohibited rather than permissible pledges and promises.  
Under the new Code, a candidate for judicial office “shall not, with 
respect to cases, controversies, or issues that are likely to come before 
the court, make pledges, promises, or commitments that are inconsis-
tent with the impartial performance of the adjudicative duties of the 
office.”356  This ban is certainly more narrowly tailored to promoting 
openmindedness and its appearance than the version that has met 
with recent hostility in the courts.  However, it retains the problem of 
identifying proscribed statements with sufficient clarity to escape the 
vice of vagueness.  This difficulty stems largely from a dilemma inher-
one hand, the reach of a meaningful pledges or promises clause can-
not be confined to campaig
these terms; otherwise, candidates “will simply formulate all their 
 
 352 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 780 (2002). 
 353 See Buckley, 997 F.2d at 228 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that clause would not allow 
a candidate to “pledge himself to be a strict constructionist . . . [or] a legal realist”). 
 354 Id. 
 355 See, e.g., Kan. Judicial Watch v. Stout, 440 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1227–28, 1231–34 
(D. Kan. 2006); N.D. Family Alliance, Inc. v. Bader, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1039 
(D.N.D. 2005); Family Trust Found. of Ky. v. Wolnitzek, 345 F. Supp. 2d 672, 701 
(E.D. Ky. 2004). 
 356 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.1(A)(13) (2007). 
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dge’s reelection slogan of “A strict sen-
tenc
 
campaign pledges in non-promissory language.”357  White’s invalida-
tion of the announce clause makes the ability to sanction de facto 
promises especially vital to effective enforcement.358  On the other 
hand, however, the same blurry line between disguised promises and 
less binding expression that challenges regulators may also baffle 
candidates.  For example, a judge was admonished by the Texas 
Commission on Judicial Conduct for stating in his campaign litera-
ture: “I’m very tough on crimes where there are victims who have 
been physically harmed . . . .  I have no feelings for the criminal.”359  
According to the Commission, these statements amounted to a 
pledge “not to show leniency toward violent criminals.”360  Similarly, 
the ABA has opined that a ju
ing philosophy!  A hard working man!” can be regarded by voters 
as a pledge of future judicial conduct.361  These and other362 determi-
nations of implied promises are hardly self-evident, and the chilling 
effect on candidates unable to anticipate the judgments of discipli-
nary bodies may ultimately prove intolerable to the Court.363
Besides uncertainty as to what counts as promises, the ABA’s 
pledges or promises clause also invites a separate charge of vague-
ness.  Even somehow devising means for alerting candidates to the 
classification of their intended statements as promises would still 
leave candidates hazy on a key point.  The ban on promises “that are 
 
 357 Raban, supra note 52, at 218; see Morrison, supra note 54, at 726 (arguing that if 
statements that come “close to prejudgment” are not prohibited, “then there is no 
point in having a no pledge rule”); see also William Glaberson, Fierce Campaigns Signal 
a New Era for State Courts, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2000, at A1. 
 358 See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 819 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that “[u]ncoup
pledges or promises is easily circum
led from the Announce Clause, the ban on 
that b
or promises clause by judge who emphasized in his campaign that he was a tenant 
and his opponent was a landlord, and that tenants had applauded his performance 
em effect of broad or 
 deterrence of speech induced 
y ).
vented”); Bogard, supra note 91, at 17 (asserting 
ecause of White, candidates “will not have to be particularly inventive to find 
ways around the pledge clause”). 
 359 Baran, supra note 34, at 13 (citing Bruce Hight, Judge Violated Conduct Code, 
Panel Decides, AUSTIN-AMERICAN STATESMAN, Jan. 31, 2001).
 360 Id. 
 361 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1444 (1980).  
 362 See, e.g., Summe v. Judicial Ret. and Removal Comm’n, 947 S.W.2d 42, 47 (Ky. 
1997) (judge’s advertisement urging election of judge who “will let no one walk 
away” deemed improper promise “in context of” judge’s campaign); In re Birnbaum, 
1997 WL 640687 (N.Y. Com. Jud. Cond. Sept. 29, 1997)  (finding violation of pledges 
as a housing judge). 
 363 See Baran, supra note 34, at 12 n.4 (comparing “in terror
ambiguous interpretations” of announce clause with
b  uncertain reach of pledges or promises clause
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inconsistent with the impartial performance of the adjudicative duties 
of the office” may avoid overbreadth,364 but at the cost of reducing 
the guidance afforded by the typical state version.  If promises can be 
reliably identified, then states’ limited imprimatur for promises of 
“the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office” 
provides a small but relatively clear safe harbor.  In contrast, the ABA 
provision resembles Laurence Tribe’s hypothetical example of a 
“sharply focused” but “patently vague” statute: “It shall be a crime to say 
anything in public unless the speech is protected by the first and fourteenth 
amendments.”365  While the model pledges or promises clause is less ex-
treme than this, it is similarly open to attack as giving insufficient no-
tice of proscribed expression.  Obviously drawing from White, the 
Model Code defines impartiality as “the condition of being without 
bias or prejudice in favor of, or against, particular parties or classes of 
parties, or their representatives, and maintenance of an open mind in 
considering issues that may come before a judge.”366  It is doubtful, 
however, that a state could fully catalogue the range of promises that 
would breach impartiality in one of these senses.  In the absence of 
such comprehensive direction to candidates, the Court would proba-
bly conclude that the model restriction’s vagueness excessively stifles 
protected campaign speech. 
To defenders of the pledges or promises clause, this analysis 
suggests the disheartening conclusion that the d
vness, overbreadth, and vagueness preclude states from crafting 
effective regulation of candidates’ promises.  While this is probably 
true, the futility of the clause might be explained on simpler grounds: 
viz., other than promissory agreements to commit illicit acts,367 the 
category of proscribable promises does not exist.  Campaign promises 
may be generally immune from prohibition for two reasons.  First, as 
with announcements of views and expressions of commitment, 
recusal of judges whose promises have displayed excessive bias pro-
vides a less restrictive alternative to suppressing speech.  Granted, 
broad license to issue campaign promises combined with rigorous 
recusal standards could produce unworkably rampant disqualification 
of judges.  Fear of this specter, however, would not justify prohibiting 
promises; under strict scrutiny, the government bears the burden of 
 
 364 But see supra notes 207–13 and accompanying text. 
 365 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1031 (2d ed. 1988). 
 366 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Terminology (2007). 
 367 See supra notes 166–68 and accompanying text. 
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ulfill.369  Strict 
scrutiny of speech restrictions, however, is designed to maximize free 
y of speakers to carry out their agendas.  If a 
parti
 views with the electorate, it is 
doub
 
rather than the bias that allegedly gave rise to it. 
The implications of minimal restraints on campaign promises 
r  troubling, but not unthinkable.  With or without ex-
b
ays to “look fa-
 
demonstrating that less speech-intrusive measures cannot accomplish 
the government’s objectives.368
The second reason for protecting judicial campaign promises re-
lates to the objection that the ready availability of recusal would ren-
der campaign promises self-nullifying.  That is, it has been suggested 
that a liberal recusal policy would “constitute electoral fraud” because 
judicial candidates would knowingly “induce[]” the public to elect 
them on the basis of promises that they could not f
expression, not the abilit
cular promise in fact betrays an inability to judge impartially 
when the issue in question arises, then the promisor is not entitled to 
participate in the decision; a constitutional right to express bias does 
not imply a right to implement it.  Conversely, acceptance of the ar-
gument against expansive recusal would not save the pledges or 
promises clause, for the argument assumes the right of candidates to 
make promises to be kept.  Rather, a determination that most cam-
paign promises could not constitute grounds for disqualification 
would entail rejection of a proposition that the Court declined to ad-
dress in White: that judicial openmindedness constitutes a compelling 
interest.  This possibility is hardly far-fetched; indeed, the premise 
that openmindedness is an interest sufficiently weighty to justify 
squelching political speech is arguably in tension with other aspects 
of the opinion.  If it is affirmatively “desirable” to have judicial candi-
dates who harbor preconceptions on legal issues,370 and imperative 
that they be allowed to share these
tful that the state can forbid candidates to in effect express their 
belief that some preconceptions are firmly settled.  A candidate who 
is resolutely wed to a certain outcome will vote that way as judge in 
any event; the question is whether voters may be told in advance. 
Under this view, a party who believes that a judge has improperly ad-
hered to a campaign promise should challenge the pertinent ruling 
a e admittedly
pansive recusal, a broad right to issue promises would permit flagrant 
assurances y judicial candidates.  A candidate might promise, for ex-
ample, “never to go easy on” accused car thieves or alw
 
 368 ACLU v. Reno, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1977). 
 369 Shepard, supra note 7, at 1082–83. 
 370 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 778 (2002). 
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ble promises—hence the White Court’s dismissive 
view
h
struction376 have adopted a clause targeting only knowing or reckless 
 
vorably on” plaintiffs in suits against insurance companies.  Similar 
latitude, however, is already available to candidates for legislative or 
executive office.  In principle, a candidate for governor could prom-
ise with legal impunity to spend recklessly, ignore irksome environ-
mental regulations, and deal harshly with minorities.  Obviously, suc-
cessful candidates do not make these kinds of promises (although 
arguably some have carried out such policies); we rely, however, on 
electoral pressures rather than legal safeguards to deter such guaran-
tees.  Aspiring legislators and executives of course still sometimes 
make irresponsi
 of promises’ binding force—but again we depend on open de-
bate and voters’ reactions to cope with this tendency.  Advocates of 
the pledges or promises clause argue that the fundamental difference 
between the judiciary and other branches of government make such 
analogies inappropriate.  In White, that rationale proved insufficient 
to sustain the announce clause against the principle that government 
could not “prohibit candidates from communicating relevant infor-
mation to voters during an election.”371  It would be an unsurprising 
extension of this logic if the Court decided that promises, too, convey 
“relevant information” that voters are entitled to hear. 
C. Misrepresent Clause 
The ABA Model Code’s newest misrepresent clause provides that 
candidates for judicial office shall not “knowingly, or wit  reckless 
disregard for the truth, make any false or misleading statement.”372  
The 1990 Model Code more specifically forbade candidates to “know-
ingly misrepresent the identity, qualifications, present position or 
other fact concerning the candidate or an opponent.”373  That provi-
sion in turn had revised the 1972 Code, which prohibited a candidate 
from “misrepresent[ing] his identity, qualifications, present position, 
or other fact.”374  The 1990 misrepresent clause was obviously de-
signed to supply the absence of an intent requirement in the prior 
version, and many states by either explicit language375 or judicial con-
 
 371 Id. at 782. 
 372 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.1(A)(11) (2007). 
 373 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(d)(iii) (1990) (amended 
CIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(1)(c) (1990). 
7B(1)(c) (2006). 
Judicial Inquiry Comm’n, 802 So. 2d 207, 217–18 (Ala. 
ura, 608 N.W. 2d 31, 42–43 (Mich. 2000). 
2003). 
 374 MODEL CODE OF JUDI
 375 See, e.g., GA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 
 376 See, e.g., Butler v. Ala. 
2001); In re Chm
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gulation of securities 
trans
that judicial campaigns involve a unique constellation of interests; 
estrictions on candidates for legislative and executive 
 of his pledge—later retracted—to lower 
 
misrepresentations.  Although prospects for the misrepresent clause 
have been rated by one thoughtful commentator as exceptionally 
bright,377 none of these variations appears likely to pass constitutional 
muster under the post-White regime. 
First, assuming a degree of state power to curb judicial candi-
dates’ misrepresentations, the ABA’s repeated revisions illustrate the 
difficulty of designing a ban that avoids First Amendment pitfalls.  
The 1990 Code’s prohibition on misstating the “identity, qualifica-
tions, present position or other fact concerning the candidate or an 
opponent” appears to sweep in enough protected speech to raise se-
rious overbreadth concerns.  The 2007 version, in categorically for-
bidding “false or misleading statement[s],” encompasses even more 
speech.  Both provisions also invite charges of vagueness.  What con-
stitutes misrepresentation of a candidate’s “present position,” for ex-
ample, can be hopelessly subjective.  Likewise, while barring “mislead-
ing” speech may be integral to proper re
actions378 and commercial advertising,379 holding political candi-
dates to account for misleading statements in a realm where discus-
sion “should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”380 is problematic 
in the extreme. 
More importantly, the misrepresent clause—perhaps even more 
than the pledges or promises clause—is hampered less by deficiencies 
in craftsmanship than by fundamental resistance to regulating politi-
cal candidates’ speech.  All forms of the clause hinge on the premise 
comparable r
office would almost certainly violate the First Amendment.  Brown v. 
Hartlage,381 discussed earlier in connection with candidates’ prom-
ises,382 also sheds light on states’ severely limited power to restrict 
false campaign speech.  Brown’s election to a county commission had 
been nullified because
commissioners’ salaries if elected.  The implicit representation that 
 
 377 See Moerke, supra note 96, at 312; see also Friedland, supra note 97, at 605 n.192 
(suggesting that state provisions patterned on 1990 Model Code’s misrepresent 
 v. SEC, 116 F.3d 1235, 1237, 1240 (8th Cir. 1997); 
566 
clause are constitutional). 
 378 See Everest Securities, Inc.
SEC v. Burns, 816 F.2d 471, 473 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 379 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 577, 
(1980). 
 380 N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
 381 456 U.S. 45 (1982). 
 382 See supra notes 165–71 and accompanying text. 
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Brown could do so was apparently false because state law barred 
commissioners from reducing their salaries while in office.383  In rein-
stating the election of Brown, who had initially been unaware of this 
constraint, the Court declared that “[t]he chilling effect of such abso-
lute accountability for factual misstatements in the course of political 
debate is incompatible with the atmosphere of free discussion con-
templated by the First Amendment in the context of political cam-
paigns.”384  This conclusion carries overtones of the Cou
cement in Cantwell v. Connecticut385 that the Constitution’s 
command of unimpeded political discourse precludes the state from 
barring “resort[] to exaggeration, to vilification of men who have 
been, or are, prominent in church and state, and even to false state-
ment.”386  Even an observer who believes that the Court’s campaign 
finance jurisprudence provides some support for restricting false 
campaign speech387 acknowledges that such restrictions are in tension 
with the central place of political expression under the First Amend-
ment.388  While a number of states have “s
l speech regarding political candidates,” these do not appea
orize disqualification or other official penalties against can
s for campaign misrepresentations.389
390
  Imposition of such s
, or of prior restraints, would almost certainly fail in light of 
ciple that in the realm of public debate, “every person must be
watchman for truth, because the forefathers did not trust 
rnment to separate the true from the false for us.”   This c
long history of campaign disto
 
 383 Brown, 456 U.S. at 50. 
 384 Id. at 61. 
  310 U.S. 296 (1940).385
 386 Id. at 310. 
 387 See William P. Marshall, False Campaign Speech and the First Amendment, 153 U. 
PA. L. REV. 285, 300–22 (2004). 
388  See id. at 298 & n.57 (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) 
(“[T]here is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of [the First] 
Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.”) (internal 
e: Regulating False Ballot 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 389 See Becky Kruse, Comment, The Truth in Masquerad
Proposition Ads Through State Anti-False Speech Statutes, 89 CAL L. REV. 129, 132 & n.13 
(2001) (collecting statutes).
  Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring) (empha-
sis added), quoted in State ex rel. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n v. 119 Vote No! Comm., 
957 P.2d 691, 695 (Wash. 1998).
390
 391 See generally KERWIN C. SWINT, MUDSLINGERS: THE TOP 25 NEGATIVE POLITICAL 
CAMPAIGNS OF ALL TIME (2006). 
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ntators have suggested that defama-
tion doctrine supports the misrepresent clause.393  Defamation suits, 
 calculus of interests from attempts to re-
strai
on the basis of such speech.  
Con
or misrepresent their own achievements.  The right to speak 
freely protects a process that allows for response by opponents, re-
flection by critics, and assessment by listeners. . . .  Any political 
er to the popular will to get votes.  De-
ed the 
 
derscores our system’s reliance on counterspeech rather than regula-
tion to correct candidates’ misrepresentations.
It is true, as the Brown Court acknowledged, that libel law dem-
onstrates the lesser protection accorded falsehoods under the First 
Amendment,  and some comme392
however, involve a different
n political candidates from issuing falsehoods.  While provision 
of redress for libel and slander qualifies as state action,394 recovery of 
damages for defamation remains essentially a private action in tort.395  
A suit to vindicate an individual’s “interests in reputation and good 
name”396 is thus a far cry from either the state’s imposition of a prior 
restraint on core political speech in the heat of a campaign or the 
overturning of the result of an election 
cerns of manageability alone—expeditiously determining false-
hood for injunctive relief, fixing the causal connection between a 
candidate’s misrepresentation and electoral victory post hoc—suggest 
the futility of seeking to regulate campaigns in this manner. 
In the aftermath of White, there is no compelling reason to think 
that these obstacles to regulation of false campaign speech apply with 
appreciably less force to judicial races.  That decision established the 
Court’s refusal to relent in its normal scrutiny of restraints on candi-
dates’ speech in the case of judicial elections; there do not appear to 
be any unique justifications for the misrepresent clause that would al-
low it to survive this scrutiny.  An early opponent of judicial campaign 
speech restrictions explained why candidates for all offices are per-
mitted to abuse their freedom of speech: 
Speakers may distort the truth, calumniate innocent opponents, 
candidate may lie or pand
spite this risk, the framers of the first amendment preferr
 
 392 456 U.S. 45, 60 (1982); see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 
(1974) (stating that “there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact”). 
393  See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 94, at 221–22; Moerke, supra note 96, at 311–12; 
see also Chemerinsky, Restrictions, supra note 9, at 746 (citing defamation law to refute 
proposition that “there are no limits on what judges can say in election campaigns”). 
394  N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964). 
 395 See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 400 (2000). 
 396 WILLIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 737 (4th ed. 1971). 
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Still,
 
open and full discussion of views, complete with full and open re-
buttal, to suppression of speech.397
 in a typical defense, Georgia argued that its version of the clause 
served the compelling interests of “preserving the integrity, impartial-
ity, and independence of the judiciary” and “ensuring the integrity of 
the electoral process and protecting voters from confusion and un-
due influence.”398  However powerful these goals, they do not furnish 
reason to restrict dishonesty by judicial candidates more than that of 
candidates for other offices.  Of the roster of interests that Georgia 
invoked, only impartiality is exceptionally prized in judges.399  Yet, as 
White defined that interest, it is unlikely that a ban on campaign mis-
representations would be deemed narrowly tailored to averting bias 
toward parties or preserving openmindedness.  The Eleventh Cir-
cuit’s conclusion that Georgia’s provision failed strict scrutiny400 was 
therefore wholly to be expected. 
D. Political Activity Clauses 
Like its predecessors, the 2007 ABA Model Code contains several 
provisions forbidding judicial candidates to engage in a variety of po-
litical activities.  These include holding office in a political organiza-
tion, making speeches on behalf of a political organization, publicly 
endorsing or opposing candidates for public office, or using a politi-
cal party’s endorsement.401  Many states have adopted similar restric-
tions on candidates’ political conduct.402
On the surface, these provisions arguably stand on a stronger 
footing than prohibitions of candidates’ commitments, promises, and 
misrepresentations.  While those clauses invade judicial candidates’ 
 
 397 Snyder, supra note 48, at 217, 249 (emphasis added). 
 398 Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
399  See Briffault, supra note 94, at 220 (questioning whether interest in integrity 
uniquely applies to the judiciary and “whether the integrity of the judiciary is more 
threatened by candidate misrepresentations than the integrity of elected executives 
and legislators”).  But see id. at 222 (indicating that the misrepresent clause could be 
ODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7 A(1)(b) (2006) (forbidding 
 (prohibiting political party’s endorsement of candidate). 
supported by a compelling interest in “informed voter decision making” in all elec-
tions). 
 400 Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1319–22. 
 401 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.1(A)(1)–(3), (7) (2007). 
 402 See, e.g., FLA. C
candidate to “publicly endorse or publicly oppose another candidate for public of-
fice”); GA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon  7 A(1) (2006) (barring candidate from 
office in a political organization); PA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7 A(1)(b) 
(2006) (prohibition on speeches for a political organization or candidate); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 12-9-2
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rference with candidates’ ability to present their 
view
edness, a ban on partisan activities during a 
campaign falls prey to the underinclusiveness that defeated the an-
 all restrictions on judicial campaign 
 
 
core campaign expression, restraints on political participation do not 
work a direct inte
s and intentions.  Moreover, the idea that insulating judges from 
partisan politics promotes a compelling interest in judicial independ-
ence is rooted in the fundamental principle of separation of pow-
ers.403  Defenders of limits on political participation can assert the 
danger posed by judicial candidates’ “placing themselves in debt to 
powerful and wide-reaching political organizations that can make or 
break them in each election.”404  They can also point to the Court’s 
recognition elsewhere that the threat of government’s politicization 
can sometimes justify curbing what is otherwise protected political ac-
tivity.405  Against the backdrop of these principles, courts before White 
not infrequently disciplined judges for partisan behavior.406
Nonetheless, most restrictions on partisan activities are likely to 
suffer the same fate as the announce clause in White.  Indeed, the 
logic of rejecting the announce clause can be readily extended to re-
straints on political participation.  White’s holding rests on a belief 
that a judicial candidate’s espousal of views does not inherently be-
tray a lack of impartiality.  In a sense, involvement in political affairs 
represents affirmation of those views.  From the voter’s perspective, a 
candidate’s partisan activity may communicate the candidate’s depth 
of commitment to certain values and principles more clearly and 
convincingly than mere campaign rhetoric.  Political participation 
thus serves an efficient signaling function for the electorate.  As to 
preserving openmind
nounce clause and threatens
 403 See Maderal, supra note 96, at 819; Weiser, supra note 96, at 665–701; see also 
Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 967–73 (1982) (upholding law requiring resigna-
tion of judges who run for legislative office). 
 404 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 768 (8th Cir. 2005) (Gibson, 
 
rv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter 
ployees’ political 
 to fair and effec-
v
) (attending political fundrais-
2d 1000 (Fla. 1993) (writing letter to editor endorsing 
, 573 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1990) (assisting son’s 
438 S.E.2d 549 (W. Va. 1993) (assisting wife’s 
a fice). 
J., dissenting); see also Briffault, supra note 94, at 232 (stating that “[j]udges who are 
politically active within their parties can come under pressure to conform their judi-
cial decisions to the party line”). 
 405 See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 142–61 (2003) (upholding limits on
oc ntributions to political candidates); U.S. Civil Se
Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 564–65 (1973) (sustaining ban on federal em
activities on the rationale that prohibition “will reduce the hazards
ti government”)e . 
 406 See, e.g., In re Barrett, 593 A.2d 529 (Del. 1991
ers); In re Glickstein, 620 So. 
another judicial candidate); In re Turner
campaign efforts); In re Codispoti, 
c mpaign for of
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nging on speech and conduct ordi-
naril
tion of underinclusiveness, the Court reasoned that the rules were tai-
ree of involvement of judicial candidates in 
wever, 
 
speech.  In the Eighth Circuit’s acerbic words on remand in White, 
“[t]he few months a candidate is ostensibly purged of his association 
with a political party can hardly be expected to suddenly open the 
mind of a candidate who has engaged in years of prior political activ-
ity.”407  By the same token, political activity clauses are an example par 
excellence of the underinclusiveness/overbreadth bind latent in the 
White Court’s analysis.  Curing underinclusiveness by disqualifying any 
candidate who had engaged in the provisions’ prohibited activities 
outside the campaign would be manifestly illegitimate.  Furthermore, 
restrictions on political activity emphatically illustrate resort to 
recusal as a means to avoid impi
y protected by the First Amendment.  The range of issues in 
which candidates’ partisan affiliation is deemed to compromise their 
openmindedness will probably be considered relatively narrow.  Ac-
cordingly, recusal in those instances when such issues arise offers a 
manageable alternative to precluding significant political involve-
ment altogether.408
Notwithstanding at least one court’s continued enforcement of 
political activity clauses, recognition of their tenuous status appears to 
be gaining.  In In re Raab,409 the New York Court of Appeals sustained 
the state’s limitations on judicial candidates’ partisan involvement.  
The Court determined that these restrictions served the State’s “over-
riding interest in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary” by 
guarding against judges’ “actually or appear[ing] to make the dispen-
sation of justice turn on political concerns.”410  Rejecting an allega-
lored to “limiting the deg
political activities during the critical time frame when the public’s at-
tention is focused on their activities.”411  As noted earlier, ho
state supreme courts’ investment in their own rules of candidate con-
duct make them questionable arbiters of campaign speech restric-
tions.412  More telling in all likelihood is the Eighth Circuit’s thor-
oughgoing dismissal of the rationales advanced for Minnesota’s 
 
 407 White, 416 F.3d at 758 (invalidating Minnesota’s partisan activities clause). 
 408 See Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm’n on Judicial Conduct, 244 F. Supp. 2d 72, 88–
89 (N.D.N.Y. 2003), rev’d on other grounds, 351 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 
U.S. 1085 (2004) (describing recusal as “proper consequence” of judge’s politically-
based bias). 
409  793 N.E.2d 1287 (N.Y. 2003) (per curiam). 
 410 Id. at 1291 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 411 Id. at 1293. 
 412 See supra notes 225–29 and accompanying text. 
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candidate’s campa 418  The purpose of assigning the collection of 
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cial candidate an  a sense of obli-
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finan
to preserving impartiality much as it found the announce clause ill-
 
 
partisan activities clause.413  That decision reinforces the expectation 
that the Supreme Court’s decision in White “will increase the influ-
ence of political parties in judicial elections.”414  Nor has the Eighth 
Circuit been alone in recognizing the apparent implications of White 
for restrictions on political behavior; soon after the Court’s decision, 
the North Carolina Supreme Court drastically relaxed its prohibition 
on partisan activity.415
E. Personal Solicitation Clause 
The ABA Model Code, like many states,416 does not permit judi-
cial candidates to “personally solicit or accept campaign contribu-
tions.”417  Instead, a candidate may delegate fundraising responsibili-
ties to a committee created for “manag[ing] and conduct[ing
ign.
an intermediary is obvious.  Personal contact betwee
d a contributor is thought to create
n, or at least the appearance of bias, when that contributor ap-
pears as a party before the candidate.419  Advocates can cite the 
mounting body of evidence on correlations between campaign con-
tributions and judicial outcomes420 in support of the restriction.  In a 
similar vein, defenders of the ban’s constitutionality rest much of 
their argument on the Supreme Court’s decisions upholding limits 
on contributions to candidates.421
Even assuming the continued validity of the Court’s campaign 
ce jurisprudence, however, barriers to personal interactions be-
tween judicial candidates and their contributors appear to face a dire 
future.  The Court is likely to find the solicitation clause unnecessary 
 413 See 416 F.3d at 754–63. 
 414 Wildermann, supra note 92, at 786. 
 415 See GASS, supra note 119, at 1. 
 416 Id. at 17. 
 417 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.1(A)(8) (2007). 
 418 Id. R. 4.1(A)8, R. 4.4(A). 
 419 See Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 883–84 (8th Cir. 2001), 
ublic Jus-
he Texas Supreme Court  (2001), http:// 
rev’d on other grounds, 536 U.S. 765 (2002); Briffault, supra note 94, at 226–27. 
 420 See, e.g., Sheila Kaplan & Zoe Davidson, The Buying of the Bench, THE NATION, 
Jan. 26, 1998, at 11, 15; Liptak & Roberts, supra note 26, at A1; Texans for P
tice, Pay to Play: How Big Money Buys Access to t
www.tpj.org/doc/2001/04/reports/paytoplay/paytoplay.pdf [hereinafter Pay to 
Play].
 421 See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 785 (8th Cir. 2005) 
(Gibson, J., dissenting); Briffault, supra note 94, at 225–26. 
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d-
ered
a more narrowly tailored remedy than wholesale prohibition.
 
 
designed for that purpose in White.  Since that decision, restrictions 
on candidates’ handling of fundraising have unsurprisingly met with 
uniform hostility in the federal courts.  At the same time that it struck 
down Minnesota’s political activity clause, the Eighth Circuit also sus-
tained a challenge to the state’s solicitation clause.422  In Weaver v. 
Bonner,423 the Eleventh Circuit similarly found that Georgia’s solicita-
tion clause was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest.424  
The Court squarely rejected the premise that a candidate’s direct in-
volvement with fundraising aggravates the intrinsic risk of bias toward 
contributors: “Successful candidates will feel beholden to the people 
who helped them get elected regardless of who did the soliciting of 
support.”425  A federal district court recently endorsed the Eleventh 
Circuit’s reasoning in striking down Kansas’s solicitation clause.426  
Whatever the force of this logic as an original matter, these courts 
appear to have accurately read the thrust of the White Court’s brand 
of strict scrutiny.  If anything, the solicitation clause can be consi
 unusually vulnerable to this review.427  The presumed cure for 
the underinclusiveness identified by the Weaver court—banning so-
licitation altogether—could not possibly survive constitutional chal-
lenge.  Moreover, even if it is accepted that some personal solicita-
tions could compromise impartiality, recusal in those cases represents 
428
 422 416 F.3d at 763–65.  The plaintiffs limited their challenge to the state’s ban on 
urrie, 
ssment of canons that they have promulgated are in any 
te 21, at 451 (describing requirement that judicial cam-
candidates’ personal solicitation from large groups and on affixing their personal 
signature on a solicitation message.  They did not challenge the requirement that 
campaign committees refrain from disclosing the identities of campaign contributors 
or those who declined to contribute when asked.  Id. at 764–65. 
 423 309 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2002). 
 424 Id. at 1322–23.  For an argument that the Eighth Circuit’s invalidation of both 
clauses threatens the viability of nonpartisan judicial elections, see Ross G. C
Note, The End of Nonpartisan Judicial Elections and the Rise of the Politiciary: The Eighth 
Circuit Strikes Down Judicial Campaign Regulations in Republican Party of Minnesota v. 
White, 51 VILL. L. REV. 665 (2006). 
 425 Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1323. 
 426 Kan. Judicial Watch v. Stout, 440 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1235–38 (D. Kan. 2006).  In 
a departure from these results, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine upheld a solici-
tation clause that barred judges from personally soliciting contributions.  In re 
Dunleavy, 2003 ME 124, 838 A.2d 338.  That restriction, however, applied only to sit-
ting judges rather than to all judicial candidates.  Id. at 351.  This distinction aside, 
state supreme courts’ asse
event suspect.  See supra notes 225–29 and accompanying text. 
 427 See Failinger, supra no
paigns “erect a screen” between candidates and contributors as “perhaps the most 
constitutionally suspect” of rules governing financing of these campaigns). 
 428 See Stout, 440 F. Supp. 2d 1209, at 1234. 
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IV. THE FACE OF UNFETTERED JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS 
AND ALTERNATIVES TO REGULATION 
For champions of judicial exceptionalism, the combination of 
gutted campaign speech restrictions and an entrenched election sys-
tem presents a disturbing prospect.  Left largely unregulated, judicial 
campaigns presumably will increasingly resemble their legislative and 
executive counterparts.  In recent years, however, judicial contests 
have already shed much of their distinctive character.  Thus, the dif-
ference between the grim scenarios feared by proponents of speech 
restrictions and the current electoral landscape may not be dramatic. 
Indeed, it is commonplace to observe that judicial elections are 
widely becoming—as Roy Schotland put it—“noisier, nastier and cost-
lier.”429  Eight years after this comment, a reporter in 2006 similarly 
described judicial campaigns as becoming “high-stakes political bat-
tles—expensive, polarized, and, at times, nasty.”430  Attack ads, a 
prominent feature of “normal” campaigns, have been deployed effec-
tively in judicial elections at least since the successful 1978 effort to 
oust Rose Bird and two of her colleagues from the California Su-
preme Court.431  While some bemoan the impact of such ads on the 
stature of the judiciary,432 this tactic has become a routine part of ju-
dicial campaigns.433  A sma
 
  Roy A. Schotland, Comment, Judicial Independence and Accountability, LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1998, at 149, 153; see Champagne, supra not
429
e 251, at 669 
S. Thompson, Judicial Retention Elections and Judicial Method: A Retro-
ustice Be Done Amid Efforts to Intimidate and Remove 
’s trust in the American justice system and its judges ”). 
 2000 confirmed theory that candidates’ ads “highlight easily 
(describing transformation of “low-key, low-budget” judicial campaigns to “hotly con-
tested, expensive races that often cannot be distinguished from contests for offices in 
the political branches”).
  Scott Michels, Judicial Elections Turn Expensive, Polarized, and Nasty, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REPORT, June 6, 2006. 
  See Robert 
430
431
spective on the California Retention Election of 1986, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 2007, 2038 (1988) 
(describing campaign mounted by opponents as “a blatant appeal to emotion and 
desire for revenge”).  A similar approach helped defeat Justice Penny White of the 
Tennessee Supreme Court in her 1977 retention election.  See Stephen B. Bright, Po-
litical Attacks on the Judiciary: Can J
Judges from Office for Unpopular Decisions?, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 308, 313–15 (1997). 
 432 See, e.g., Berness, supra note 16, at 1031 (asserting that the use of negative ads 
threatens to “erode the public
 433 See Champagne, supra note 251, at 673 (concluding that studies of judicial elec-
tions in four states in
absorbed negative messages about the opponent”) (quoting STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE 
ET AL., THE MEDIA GAME: AMERICAN POLITICS IN THE TELEVISION AGE 100 (1993)); see 
also M.J. Ellington, Attack of the Negative Ads, THE DECATUR DAILY (Ala.), Oct. 22, 2006 
(quoting Alabama political scientist that State’s judicial races had become negative 
about a decade earlier and that “judicial candidates are sliding down the slippery 
slope of political muck”). 
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lavor of many of these attacks.  “He sexually molested multiple 
West Virginia children . . . Liberal Judge Warren McGraw cast the de-
ciding vote to set this reprehensible criminal free.”434  “Carol Hun-
stein . . . voted to throw out evidence that convicted a cocaine traf-
ficker . . . [she] even ignored extensive case law and overruled a jury 
to free a savage rapist.”435  “First [Judge Nancy Saitta] took thousands 
in contributions from two convicted topless club owners.  Then she 
slashed bail for gang bangers who brutalized an MGM employee.”436
As for “costlier,” expenditures on judicial races have also begun 
to catch up with their legislative and executive counterparts.  As has 
been amply documented, money is poured into judicial campaigns at 
levels that would have been considered staggering only a short time 
ago.  In 2000, candidates for state supreme courts as a whole ex-
ceeded previous records for fundraising by 61%.437  By 2004, the aver-
age amount of funds raised by winning candidates leapt to forty-five 
percent over the average for 2002.438  Early figures compiled for the 
2006 campaign season indicate that expenditures have continued to 
escalate.439  While the latest scale of contributions and spending may 
fuel cynicism about judges’ aloofness from political considerations, 
widespread suspicion about the influence of money has existed for 
years.440  In the minds of much of the public, then, judicial races have 
been steadily evolving into politics by other means.441
 
 434 Adam Liptak, Judicial Races in Several States Become Partisan Battlegrounds, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 24, 2004, at A1. 
 435 Press Release, Brennan Ctr. for Justice, Once Courtly, Campaigns for Amer-
 Sponsor, Airing, and Cost, 
ww.brennancenter.org/press_detail.asp?key=100 
Reform Focusing on the 2000 Race for the Supreme 
lan & Davidson, supra note 420, at 
ica’s High Courts Now Dominated By Television Attack Ads (Nov. 2, 2006), 
http://www.brennancenter.org/press_detail.asp?key=100&subkey= 38281. 
 436 Id. 
 437 See Roy A. Schotland, Financing, supra note 33, at 850 & n.6. 
 438 Deborah Goldberg et al., The New Politics of Judicial Elections 2004 (2005), avail-
able at  http://www.justiceatstake.org/files/NewPoliticsReport2004.pdf. 
 439 See, e.g., Brennan Ctr. for Justice, Buying Time 2006:
available at http://www.brennancenter.org/dynamic/subpages/download_file_4714 
0.pdf; Press Release, Brennan Ctr. for Justice, Two Years After Record-Setting Su-
preme Court Campaign, Illinois Appellate Court Campaign Record Smashed (Oct. 
24, 2006), available at http://w
&subkey=47155. 
 440 See Stuart Taylor, Gagging Judicial Candidates Won’t Save State Courts, NAT’L L.J., 
Mar. 25, 2002; Kara Baker, Comment, Is Justice for Sale in Ohio? An Examination of Ohio 
Judicial Elections and Suggestions for 
Court, 35 AKRON L. REV. 159, 160–66 (2001); Kap
11, 15; Pay to Play, supra note 420. 
 441 See, e.g., Glaberson, supra note 357, at A1; Baran, supra note 34, at 13 (asserting 
that in states with partisan elections, “political parties see judicial elections as part of 
an overall political agenda”). 
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e the likely fall of the commit clause and pledges or prom-
ises 
ry approach is conversion of manda-
tory 
 
Against this backdrop, the tumbling of remaining speech restric-
tions may only aggravate somewhat a substantially politicized process.  
As for dangers specifically posed by unrestrained speech, these were 
largely unleashed by White’s invalidation of the announce clause. 
Even befor
clause, judicial candidates can effectively signal their intent con-
cerning the disposition of legal issues.  More than one commentator 
noted the ease with which candidates can “telegraph” the types of rul-
ings the electorate can expect from them.442  Indeed, the climate of 
laxity engendered by White may have induced some candidates to go 
further and assume the invalidity of restraints on more explicit decla-
rations of their intentions.443
Perhaps resigned to the futility of eliminating judicial elections 
or enforcing speech codes, proponents of reform have advanced 
other means to curb the excesses of judicial campaigning and pro-
mote the election of worthy judges.  These proposals fall roughly into 
three categories: voluntarist, informational, and structural.  Perhaps 
the most straightforward volunta
restraints on speech to guidelines that candidates are urged to 
follow.444  Compliance with these norms could be monitored by non-
governmental groups created for this purpose.445  Of course to have 
any meaningful impact on campaigning, such panels would have to 
 
 442 See Bogard, supra note 91, at 17; Recent Changes, supra note 125, at 836 (remarks 
of Bill Weisenberg). 
 443 In one instance, a candidate volunteered his belief that homosexuals should 
not be permitted to adopt children.  Matthew Eisley, Bench Hopefuls Bank on Personal 
Beliefs, THE NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 31, 2004, at 30, available at http:// 
www.newsobserver.com/954/story/271102.html.  Another candidate, after harshly 
criticizing decisions invalidating Ohio’s scheme for school funding, told an assembly 
of teachers from the Ohio Education Association that his election would send a 
io.”  Andrew Goldstein, Money Talks, 
E  
 Off to an Early 
t s for Lower Courts, Mar. 9, 2006, 
tt 0309-12.htm. 
23 (describing voluntary compliance with speech 
u solutions” to the problem of 
ving the Constitutional Tension Be-
“simple and direct message to the out-of-control Ohio General Assembly: When you 
come to Columbus in January, bring your toothbrushes, because you will be staying 
nu til you comply with the laws of the State of Oh
L A , Jan.–Feb. 2005, at 29 (internal citGAL FFAIRS ation omitted).  One candidate went
so far as to declare that “I pledge to hold the line on new taxes.”  Press Release, 
Brennan Ctr. for Justice, TV Advertising in Texas Judicial Races Gets
S art: More than $270,000 Spent in Primary Election
h p://www.commondreams.org/news2006/
 444 See GASS, supra note 119, at 24–25 (advocating “aspirational” standards of con-
duct); Ogunro, supra note 96, at 
g ideline as “[o]ne of the most noncontentious viable 
unregulated campaign expression). 
 445 See Ferris K. Nesheiwat, Judicial Restraint: Resol
tween First Amendment Protection of Political Speech and the Compelling Interest in Preserving 
Judicial Integrity During Judicial Elections, 24 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 757, 760 (2006); CALL 
TO ACTION, supra note 25, at 30–31. 
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ntators, a broader 
campaign of public education would offer voters profiles of candi-
dates and explanations of dicial role.447  Candidates 
migh
 
publicize candidates’ adherence to or departure from the recom-
mended standards;446 they would thus perform an important informa-
tional function.  Nor would the communications undertaken by these 
or similarly proposed groups be confined to reporting candidates’ 
scorecards.  As envisioned by numerous comme
 the larger ju
t also benefit from campaign conduct committees, which would 
“serve as a resource for judges and judicial candidates, [and] assist in 
educating judges and judicial candidates about ethical campaign con-
duct.”448  High on some agendas, too, are disclosure laws that would 
alert the public to the identities of campaign contributors and the ex-
tent of their generosity.449  The prospects for widespread adoption of 
such proposals, much less their efficacy, remain uncertain.  They 
would, however, carry out Justice Kennedy’s charge in White to the le-
gal profession and other interested parties to “reach voters who are 
uninterested or uninformed or blinded by partisanship, and . . . [to] 
urge upon the voters a higher and better understanding of the judi-
cial function and a stronger commitment to preserving its finest tra-
ditions.”450
451
452
453
454
As to revision of the formal rules governing judicial elections, 
proposals have focused on mechanisms to enhance the independ-
ence of successful candidates once in office.  An idea with widespread 
support—endorsed even by a vigorous opponent of speech restric-
tions —is to lengthen judicial terms in order to diminish pressure 
from popular opinion.   One observer called it “[t]he most impor-
tant single step” to address the challenges posed by judicial elec-
tions.   Public financing of judicial elections, notably undertaken by 
North Carolina in the wake of White,  has been advanced by many as 
 
  See Nesheiwat, supra note 445, at 760, 791. 
  See, e.g., Ifill, supra note 236, at 98; Wildermann, supra note 92, at 795. 
448
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447
  Joe Gyan, ‘Restraint’ Urged After Rules Relaxed in Judicial Elections, THE ADVOCATE 
(Baton Rouge, La.), July 20, 2002, at 2B (quoting recommendation of National Sym-
posium on Judicial Campaign Conduct and the First Amendment).
, at 21. 
 449 See, e.g., Goldberg et al., supra note 438, at 36. 
 450 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 795 (2002) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
 451 See Snyder, supra note 48, at 237–38, 258. 
 452 See, e.g., Symposium, Judicial Elections and Campaign Finance Reform, 33 U. TOL. 
L. REV. 335, 340–41 (2002); CALL TO ACTION, supra note 25, at 16–17. 
 453 Schotland, Should Judges, supra note 15, at 11. 
 454 Goldberg et al., supra note 438
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cing the influence of political parties natu-
ally favor nonpartisan elections;456 White, however, has called their 
constitutionality into question.457
To those who fear the politicization of judicial selection, of 
course, all of these proposals remain second-best solutions.  Ideally, 
they would rather replace elections altogether with an appointment 
system, or at least a variation of the Missouri plan combining merit 
selection and retention elections.458  Some observers, however, con-
tend that shifting to appointments will fail to purge judicial selection 
of politics; rather, the choice of judges is “an inherently political 
process.”459  Indeed, a commentator recently argued that the phe-
nomenon of “prejudging judges” is more pronounced in the ap-
pointment process than in elections.460  In any event, the debate over 
the relative merits of the two methods promises to remain academic, 
as citizens persist in refusing to yield the franchise.  And whatever the 
politics of judicial elections, they are unlikely to be hindered by re-
straints on campaign speech in the years to come. 
CONCLUSION 
It is easy to lament the corrosive effects of selecting judges by the 
same political process we use for legislators and executive branch of-
ficials.  The regrettable tactics of modern campaigning—visceral ap-
peals, simplistic reduction of complex issues, shrill ad hominem at-
tacks, the lavish expenditure of funds by interest groups—are even 
more disturbing when employed to determine the members of a sup-
posedly impartial and principled judiciary.  Mostly unsuccessful in ef-
forts to supplant elections with appointments, the bar has under-
standably turned to limitations on candidates’ speech to temper the 
excesses of judicial campaigning.  The Court’s decision in White, 
however, sent an unmistakable signal that the First Amendment 
 
a means of curbing the influence of campaign contributors.   In ad-
dition, proponents of redu
455
r
 455 See, e.g., Carter, Boosting, supra note 92, at 34; Goldberg et al., supra note 438, at 
37; Ifill, supra note 236, at 93–95. 
 456 See, e.g., CALL TO ACTION, supra note 25, at 14–15. 
 457 See Schotland, Should Judges, supra note 15, at 8–9. 
 458 See supra notes 28–31 and accompanying text. 
 459 Camille M. Tribble, Awakening a Slumbering Giant: Georgia’s Judicial Selection Sys-
tem After White and Weaver, 56 MERCER L. REV. 1035, 1035 (2005); see Jonathan L. En-
tin, Judicial Selection and Political Culture, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 523, 540–56 (2002) (ana-
lyzing influence of political considerations in federal judicial appointments). 
 460 See Jonathan Remy Nash, Prejudging Judges, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2168, 2180–99 
(2006). 
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largely forecloses this means of curbing political elements of an in-
trinsically political process.  The Court’s confinement of that holding 
to Minnesota’s announce clause reflects no more than the absence of 
additional restrictions to consider on that occasion.  Justice Gins-
burg’s forlorn protest that T“[j]udges are not politicians, and the First 
Amendment does not require that they be treated as politicians sim-
ply because they are chosen by popular vote” TTPF461FPTT appears destined to 
fall on deaf ears when other provisions of campaign speech codes ar-
rive before the Court.  Thus, the latest version of the ABA Model 
Code, as well as comparable state canons, likely amount to rearguard 
resistance to the inexorable Timplications of White.  Just as the bar was 
repeatedly rebuffed in its attempts to stem lawyer advertising, TPF462FPT so it 
now faces the prospect of an equally dismal track record in seeking to 
contain campaign expression.  Justice Kennedy’s faith that “democ-
racy and free speech are their own correctives”TPF463FPT may be open to 
doubt, but they will be all that remains when censorship of judicial 
candidates is eliminated. 
 
 
 TP461PT Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 821 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
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Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 647–49 (1985); Bates v. State Bar of 
Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 366–79 (1977). 
 TP463PT White, 536 U.S. at 795 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
